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INTRODUCTION
Standard-form contracts offered to consumers contain numerous terms
and clauses, most of which are ancillary to the main terms of the transac
tion. We call these ancillary terms "boilerplate provisions." Since most
consumers do not read boilerplate provisions or, if they do, find them hard
to understand, 1 courts are suspicious of boilerplate provisions and some
2
times find them unenforceable under the doctrine of unconscionability. At
times, courts conclude that harsh terms have not been accepted by consum
3
ers in the first place and therefore are not included in the contract, and on

I. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1 1 74, I I 77, 1 1 79 ( 1 983) ("Virtually every scholar who has written about contracts of adhe

sion has accepted the truth [that the adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read the standard
terms before signing the document] ... and the few empirical studies that have been done have
agreed.").
2.
See u.c.c. § 2-302( 1 ) (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 ( 1 98 1 ); E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 308 (Aspen Law & Bus. 3d ed. 1 999).

Courts could also declare harsh terms unenforceable when such terms are against public pol
icy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1 78-99, 2 1 1 cmt. c ( 1 98 1 ). Such tenns are also
subject to the overriding obligation of good faith. Id. at §§ 21 1 cmt.c, 205.

3.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 1 1 (3) cmts.b, c (noting instances where
enforcement of terms is accepted by customers); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 4.26, at
298-300. For the various legal tools used to handle harsh tenns in standard-form contracts, includ
ing the "reasonable expectation" doctrine, see Robert A.Hillman & Jeffrey J.Rachlinski, Standard
Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U.L.REv. 429, 456--60 (2002).
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other occasions courts interpret boilerplate provisions in favor of consumers,
4

applying the rule of interpretation against the draftsman.

There is ample legal writing discussing the justification for legislatures'
5
and courts' intervention in consumer standard-form contracts. Most law and
economics scholars agree that striking down harsh clauses included in
boilerplate language could be justified when there is asymmetry of informa
tion--either factual or legal-between the supplier and consumers with
respect to the harsh clause, which precludes consumers from fully under
6
standing the effects of the clause on their legal rights. In such cases, there is
a risk that the supplier will extract payment from the consumer without the
latter being aware of the fact that the payment does not reflect the reduction
7
of value due to the harsh clause. Thus, if an exclusionary boilerplate clause
phrased in a sophisticated legal manner releases the supplier from liability
for late delivery of goods, the consumer might not realize the full effects of
such a clause or understand the very high price she might pay for it in the
8
future. If this risk is a substantial one, a court could be justified in striking
down the clause. If, however, most consumers could reasonably understand
the exclusionary clause and estimate its costs for them, a court's interven
tion would not be justified, since absent asymmetry of information there is
no reason to suspect that incorporating the clause into the contract would be

4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (198 1 ); see also FARNSWORTH, supra
note 2, § 4.26, at 300.
5. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REv. 2 1 1 , 240--4 1 ( 1 995) (stating that for the past forty years, contract scholars have been
preoccupied with enforceability of preprinted contract terms); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rational
ity, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 203 (2003) [hereinafter
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality] (arguing that the drafting parties will have a market incentive to
include terms in their standard forms that favor themselves, whether or not such terms are efficient);
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 67375 (1998) (suggesting that courts use nonenforcement default rules to force parties to fill contractual
gaps); Eric A.P osner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doc
trine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283,
284 (1995) ("[T]he efficiency argument concludes that courts should enforce all voluntary contracts
that do not produce negative externalities, regardless of their distributive consequences."); Rakoff,
supra note 1 , at 1 238.
6. Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1 226 ("[T]he rational course is to focus on the few terms that are
generally well publicized and of immediate concern, and to ignore the rest."). But see Douglas G.
B aird, Commercial Norms and the Fine Art of the Small Con, 98 MICH. L. REV. 27 1 6, 2724 (2000)
("General rules governing the use of preprinted terms do little with respect to places where abuse is
likely and too much where it is not.").
7. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683, 770 (1 993) ("[T]he efficiency of consumer product
markets depends upon consumers' ability to overcome information costs, for without full informa
tion consumers are unable to make consumption and warranty decisions that reflect their true
preferences."); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 585 (1 990) ("[I]mperfect consumer information causes a
tendency toward inefficiency in transactions involving consumer form contracts.").
8. Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, supra note 5, at 1 2 1 7 - 1 8 ("Efficiency requires not only
that buyers be aware of the content of form contracts, but also that they fully incorporate that infor
mation into their purchase decisions. Because buyers are boundedly rational rather than fully
rational decisionmakers, they will infrequently satisfy this requirement.").
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On the contrary, when information is symmetric, both parties

strive to incorporate efficient terms into their contract, terms that increase
the surplus of the contract to the benefit of both parties.
In this Article, we argue that boilerplate provisions and standard-form
contracts are used--or could be used-by suppliers for purposes other than
the familiar one discussed above. Some of these uses are efficient and some
are inefficient. What all these uses have in common is that their virtue to the
supplier lies in the transaction costs imposed upon consumers, from which
the supplier expects to gain. '0 However, in contrast to the familiar use of
boilerplate provisions as creating asymmetry of information between the
supplier and consumers, we discuss cases in which the asymmetry of infor
mation is not necessarily between the supplier and consumers, but rather
between different kinds of consumers or between consumers and noncon
sumers. We also discuss cases in which the supplier could gain from the
transaction costs imposed on consumers even absent any kind of informa
tion asymmetries, as well as cases in which the transaction costs imposed by
the supplier could be beneficial from a welfare perspective.
In the following paragraphs we summarize the four main categories of
cases that are the focus of this Article, characterized by the different goals
suppliers might try to achieve by imposing transaction costs on consumers.
In the first category of cases, the supplier uses boilerplate provisions and
other contractual terms for segmentation of consumers. By creating transac
tion costs that some consumers are willing to bear while others are not,
suppliers could achieve several goals. First, suppliers may want to transact
with certain consumers but not with others. At times a supplier could use
boilerplate provisions to screen out the unwanted consumers by imposing
high transaction costs upon them, while at the same time keeping transac
tion costs low enough for other consumers. On other occasions, the supplier
could use boilerplate terms to impose the same transaction costs on all con
sumers, expecting only the consumers he would like to transact with to incur
these costs. Second, the supplier could use boilerplate provisions for price
discrimination by conferring benefits only on consumers who read, under
stand, and remember certain boilerplate provisions. Third, the supplier may
want to use boilerplate provisions to hide benefits conferred upon one group
of consumers from the eyes of another group that did not receive these bene
fits. Fourth, boilerplate provisions could be a useful and reliable tool for
suppliers for receiving information about consumers' preferences. Suppliers

9. Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Con
sumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 263, 1 299 (1 993) (concluding that buyers should be
bound only to those form terms that they "know and comprehend").
This is true regardless of the supplier's market power, since even a monopoly has no reason to

See Richard
Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relation
ships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 36 1 , 369 ( 1 991); Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, supra note 5, at 1 2 1 1 -1 2.
include a harsh clause that reduces the supplier and the consumer's joint payoffs.

Craswell,

10.

The phrase "transaction costs" is used in this Article in the broader sense, to encompass

not only information barriers, but also cognitive limitations. We recognize that in other contexts it
makes sense to distinguish between the two, as demonstrated by Korobkin,

supra note 5.

Bounded Rationality,
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could do so by monitoring the way in which consumers explore boilerplate
language, given the transaction costs they need to incur in order to conduct
such exploration.
In the second category of cases, the supplier uses boilerplate provisions
for stabilization of cartels and obstruction of competition among suppliers.
First, suppliers could use boilerplate language to make their contracts com
plex so that consumers would find it difficult to compare contracts of
competing suppliers. Such complexity deters suppliers from deviating from
explicit or tacit cartels, since consumers would have difficulty in compre
hending that the price-cutting supplier is offering them a better deal.
Complexity also tends to raise prices in oligopolistic markets even absent
tacit or explicit cartels. Moreover, complexity could deter entry of new firms
into the suppliers' market. Second, suppliers could use beneficial boilerplate
provisions, available only to consumers who read, understand, and remem
ber them, in order to facilitate the sustainability of tacit or explicit cartels.
While collusion over harsh boilerplate provisions could relatively easily
break down, collusion over the terms applied to nonreaders of boilerplate
provisions, coupled with benefits granted to readers of these provisions,
could be more sustainable, and at times, also more profitable. Third, suppli
ers could use beneficial boilerplate provisions, available only to readers of
such terms who understand and remember them, as an anticompetitive sig
naling device. The beneficial provisions are a relatively credible and cheap
signal of how efficient and competent the supplier is. Such a signal could
discourage welfare-enhancing (unsuccessful) attempts by rivals to exclude
the supplier and could also deter entry of new suppliers.
In the third category of cases the supplier tries to create a facade of a
contract that is different than its true nature. Sometimes the supplier creates
a facade of a fair contract by balancing harsh terms in the contract with
beneficial terms hidden in boilerplate provisions. This facade can help im
munize the contract from intervention by courts or administrative bodies or
from public criticism. The supplier lowers his costs of granting the counter
vailing benefits by creating transaction costs that preclude many consumers
from benefiting from these terms. Additionally, in some cases the supplier is
concerned about criticism coming from nonparties for conferring far
reaching benefits to parties to the contract. By raising the transaction costs
of nonparties and making it hard for them to understand the nature of the
contract, the supplier may escape their criticism and related consequences.
In the fourth and last category of cases, standard-form contracts are used
by the supplier to create self-inflicted transaction costs that credibly signal
that the contract, or some of its terms, are not negotiable. This credible sig
nal serves the supplier's interests in various contexts. In some contexts, the
value of a beneficial term in the contract is contingent upon its non
negotiability. Sometimes the supplier may want to signal to each of his
commercial buyers that the terms of sale granted to his other commercial
buyers are not negotiable. This could help the supplier commit to not grant
ing concessions to any of his buyers. Also, suppliers who participate in an
implicit or explicit cartel may want to induce their rivals to participate as
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well by making their own defections from the cartel more transparent. They
can do so by adopting standard contracts and increasing their own transac
tion costs of secretly negotiating them with selected customers.
The various uses of boilerplate language and standard-form contracts to
generate transaction costs raise the question of whether these uses are desir
able from a social perspective. Some of the uses are desirable, while some
are either undesirable altogether or undesirable under certain circumstances.
While a comprehensive exploration of all of the policy implications of all of
the above-mentioned uses of boilerplate and standard-form contracts is be
yond the scope of this Article, we focus in detail on the policy implications
of beneficial boilerplate provisions. In doing so we also discuss certain doc
trines and principles taken from antitrust law, consumer law, contracts, and
torts, and demonstrate how these doctrines and rules could be applied to
cope with the harsh effects that beneficial boilerplate terms could cause.
This Article is organized as follows: in Parts I through IV we discuss in
detail the various uses of boilerplate provisions and standard-form contracts,
as represented by the four categories of cases summarized above. In Part V
we evaluate beneficial boilerplate terms from a normative point of view, and
discuss the attitude the law should take toward them.
I. SEGMENTATION OF CONSUMERS
A. Screening Consumers Out
Sometimes the supplier is not interested in transacting with all consum
ers but only with some consumer segments. She could use boilerplate
language to screen out unwanted consumers by inflicting high transaction
costs upon them, thereby making the transaction prohibitively costly for
them. The supplier's desire to transact only with some consumers but not
with others could stem from their different qualities, different abilities of
performance, or any other characteristic that could affect the supplier's ex
pected profits. As we will immediately see through the first hypothetical
example, not all such uses of boilerplate provisions should be permitted by
law.

Example

1.

Language.

Supplier offers apartments for rent in an urban

place in Israel where most residents are Jewish. Supplier prefers not to
transact with Arabs partly because his employees do not speak Arabic, but
mainly because he believes that if he could keep the residency homoge
nous and Jewish, he would reap more profits from renting the apartments.
This is because many Jewish people are reluctant to live in the same
neighborhood as Arabs. Supplier offers his potential consumers a standard
form contract drafted in Hebrew, which most potential Arab consumers
find hard to read and understand.

11

1 1.
Similarly, English-speaking vendors and suppliers contract with non-English small
business owners primarily through the medium of English-language standardized forms. Julian S.
Lim, Comment, Tongue-Tied in the Market: The Relevance of Contract Law to Racial-Language
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Drafting the contract in Hebrew and conducting all negotiations in He
brew, raises the transaction costs of people who do not read the language.
The reason for using language as a screening device could be the supplier's
racism or his assumption that the consumers he wants to attract are racists.
Instead of explicitly refusing to transact with Arabs, which is prohibited by
law and could damage the supplier's reputation, the supplier may find it less
costly to discriminate implicitly by drafting and negotiating all contracts in
Hebrew. Moreover, if criticized, the supplier could always argue that draft
ing and negotiating in Arabic requires

him

to

hire Arabic-speaking

employees or translators, resulting in high costs that are not economically
justified, given the few potential Arab consumers.
The next example illustrates cases where the supplier wishes to particu
larly attract customers who make repeat transactions or large purchases. The
reason could be, for example, that the supplier bears more transaction costs
when he has to deal with many new customers, and he could economize on
his transaction costs when he deals with experienced repeat purchasers.
More generally, with large purchasers, the supplier does not have to recruit a
multitude of customers in order to reach an efficient scale of operation and
recoup his fixed costs.

Example

2.

Repeat Consumers.

Supplier offers sophisticated technical

equipment for rent for short periods of time. Supplier prefers to serve only
repeat consumers. Practically, he cannot charge the one-time consumers
higher prices, either because the law prohibits discrimination on the basis

of the quantity purchased, 12 or because it is hard to distinguish between the
one-time consumers and the repeat consumers. Supplier could screen out

the one-time consumers by making the i nitial transaction costs of renting
equipment for the first time high enough that the transaction is worthwhile
only for repeat consumers. The supplier can achieve this goal by compli
cating the boilerplate language of the standard-form contract and by
13
complicating the contracting stage as a whole.

Minorities, 91 CAL. L. REV. 579, 586-90 (2003); see also Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection
for Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1027, 1036 (1996) ("Although most merchants will not affirmatively misrepresent their deals to the
Spanish-Only Consumer, many merchants will transact business with them partially or entirely in
English.").
12. According to Section l (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000), "[i]t
shall be unlawful . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality .. . where the effect of such discrimination may be ... to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who .. . knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination."
This section has been interpreted to prohibit quantity discounts granted to large commercial buy
ers--discounts which small commercial buyers cannot enjoy due to their limited demand-unless
they are justified by different costs involved in selling different quantities. See Fed. Trade Comm'n
v.Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
13. Illustrative are the registration forms of Internet web sites offering services free of
charge. In order to become a member of such web site, the user must fill out various registration
forms. As part of the registration process, the web site sends authentication messages to the user's
email address and the user has to confirm their receipt to activate his membership. One of the rea
sons for such requirements could be the imposition of additional transaction costs in order to screen
out one-time users. See, e.g., DriverGuide, Join for Free, http://members.driverguide.com/ums/
index.php (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).

990

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:983

In Example 2, the boilerplate language, standard-form contracts, and
paperwork create artificial barriers for consumers entering into the contract.
Only consumers who expect to gain high enough profits will incur the trans
action costs, and typically those will be the repeat consumers. Note that if a
one-time consumer enters into the contract after all, we assume the supplier
would not be able to extract a higher price from him. If he could do so, it
would be a case of quantity discounts.
The creation of high transaction costs in order to screen out one-time
consumers is a very common phenomenon. Thus, consumer membership
clubs linked to the supplier's store or chain of stores are beneficial to the
supplier only when repeat consumers are concerned, since the administrative
costs of adding a member to the club could be higher than the expected
profits the supplier could make on a one-time consumer. Increasing the con
sumers' transaction costs in joining the club by asking them to read and fill
out long and time-consuming documents and forms could be a practical way
14
to screen out one-time consumers.
Screening out small commercial buyers could also be desirable to some
suppliers. Suppliers can do so by imposing transaction costs that are high
enough to deter small buyers from entering the contract. If a small grocery
store, for example, needs to fill out complex forms and questionnaires each
month in order to buy from the supplier, it may switch to a different supplier
who does not impose such transaction costs. A large- or medium-sized su
permarket chain, on the other hand, may find such transaction costs
negligible compared to the volume of their business with the supplier.
One may ask why suppliers often screen out one-time or small custom
ers by imposing transaction costs rather than by using a subscription fee or
other fixed payment that would be prohibitive for one-time or small custom
ers but worthwhile for repeat or large purchasers. After all, while transaction
costs constitute a net loss to both sides of the contract, a subscription fee
increases the supplier's revenue. One reason could be that with subscription
fees, customers may suspect that the supplier is using the subscription fee to
make additional profits at their expense and may therefore prefer a compet-

1 4. Another example is found in a new service offered by Visa in Israel. The credit card
company issues credit cards to minors (called Y cards), and limits the credit to a few hundred shek
els that the minor's parent transfers in advance to the minor's credit account. See Y card,
http://www.ycard.co.il (Israeli web site). In order to issue the card, the minor (and his parent) need
to fill out long forms and also bring them in person to the bank. We speculate that if the transaction
costs had been very low, many minors would have applied for the credit card without considering
seriously enough whether they really intend to use it. By raising transaction costs, Visa ensures that
applicants, before applying for the card, will give it a second thought. This way, the credit card
issuer saves its costs of issuing a card to minors who do not really intend to use it.
Another example is the members club "The University Book Store," which offers house
charge accounts to those who find it easier and who qualify," and promises its members "no
annual fee; Low credit card interest on your revolving credit balance; Special promotions avail
able only to University Book Store credit card holders." In order to become a member, the
customer has to fill in a time-consuming enrollment form, print it out, and send it by post
mail. See University Book Store, Customer Service, http://www.bookstore.washington.edu/
services.taf?dept=about&category=services&par=services&ttl=services. A similar practice is used
by "frequent buyers" clubs. See, e.g., Duty Free Stores New Zealand, http://www.dutyfreestores.co.nzJ
Frequent%20Buyer%20Club Oast visited Jan. 30, 2006).
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ing supplier, who screens out one-time customers via transaction costs
15
Another reason is that the supplier would

rather than via subscription fees.

often like to make the subscription fee smaller for large customers than for
16
small customers, in order to be attractive to large customers. For practical
reasons, however, it would be hard for the supplier to charge different sub
scription fees to different consumers. When using transaction costs, the
supplier could often achieve such discrimination in favor of large customers
since large customers often find the transaction costs less burdensome than
small customers do. For example, a large supermarket chain could assign
one of its various employees the task of specializing in the paper work re
quired by various suppliers. The owner of a small grocery store, on the other
hand, would have to spend his own valuable time on going through such
paperwork.
Another method for screening out small or one-time customers is
through quantity discounts. Recall, however, that these depend on the sup
plier being able to distinguish between small and large buyers. Furthermore,
when small and large commercial buyers compete with each other, quantity
17

discounts are generally prohibited.

In other cases, the supplier is concerned about "risky" consumers, who
would not fulfill their part of the deal or would otherwise burden the sup
plier. Ideally, the supplier could charge them higher prices or collect
damages from them when they fail to perform their part of the contract.
Practically, however, requiring consumers to pass the test of high transaction
costs could often be a better choice. This practical solution would be more
attractive than the other alternatives when consumers' defaults are unobserv
able or unverifiable, when the expected damages from the defaults are too
low to justify litigation, or when it is impractical to charge more risky con
sumers higher prices, for example, because it is impossible to identify them
in advance as risky. Examples of such cases are short-term employment con
18
tracts and short-term rental contracts. In both types of cases, it is hard for
the supplier to predict which employees or consumers are risky, in the sense
that they might change their minds and defect, either before performance
1 5.

One could claim that a subscription fee does not necessarily deter consumers because it

allows the supplier to charge lower prices per unit. This claim does not always hold, however. For
behavioural reasons, and also due to Jack of sufficient information, consumers cannot accurately
calculate the value of their time in bearing the transaction costs imposed by the supplier. They are
aware, however, of the fact that a subscription fee can be used by the supplier to extract surplus from
them and transaction costs cannot. Accordingly, they may prefer a supplier who screens out using
transaction costs to a supplier who screens out using a subscription fee and charges the same price
per unit as the first supplier. See Darren Duxbury et al., Mental Accounting and Decision Making:
Evidence Under Reverse Conditions Where Money is Spent for Time Saved, 26 J. EcoN. PSYCH. 567
(2005) (stating that individuals irrationally tend to value money more than they value time).

1 6.

Large customers enjoy the benefits of such discrimination not only directly, but also

indirectly, since the quality of the supplier's services could be enhanced when small customers are
excluded.

1 7.

See supra note 12.

1 8.

For example, see the sophisticated application form and the rules and regulations that

must be followed in order to enroll in Educational Housing Services in New York.
Housing Services, http://www.studenthousing.org/ (last visited Dec.

2, 2005).

See Educational
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starts or a short while thereafter, leaving the supplier with unrecoverable

losses. The following example is illustrative of such cases:

Example 3. Short-term Employment.

Supplier is a fast-food chain that hires

unprofessional manpower for various tasks. Supplier realizes that very of
ten employees quit a few days following commencement of employment,
after the supplier has invested efforts in training them for the job. For prac
tical reasons, the supplier can neither charge them for its costs when they

quit, nor charge them in advance when hired. 19

As we have explained, conditioning employment upon incurring high

transaction costs could be a practical technique for screening out employees
who are not certain whether they want the job or not. Asking potential em

ployees to fill out long forms and requiring them to sign detailed contracts
that require costly legal consulting could serve as a guarantee that the poten

tial employee is serious enough about the job. Notice that while it is
relatively easy to verify the employees' competence for the job, it is much
harder to verify their willingness to persist in the job for a long period of
2
time. 0
We conclude this section with a (wild?) speculation about the submis

sion process conducted by top U.S. Law Reviews. We have noticed that

most top law reviews in the United States condition submission of a paper
upon mailing a hard copy to the law review in addition to an electronic ver
sion that should follow.21 The hard-copy requirement could create

transaction costs that would screen out writers that may be thought of as less
likely to succeed in their submission. Such screening out would save the law

reviews costs and time. W riters for whom the hard copy requirement creates

19. See, for example, job search sites on the Internet, Monster, http://www.monster.com (last
visited Jan. 8, 2006), and Career Builder, http://www.careerbuilder.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
Both sites offer information about jobs free of charge and allow for online applications to various
firms, but require applicants to fill out long forms that differ from each other for each and every
workplace. Also, the complicated process of filling out the application forms required for receiving
a visa to enter the United States is an example of raising transaction costs in order to screen out
applicants who are not sure whether they indeed want to enter the United States. See U.S Immigra
tion Support, http://www.usimmigrationsupport.org (last visited Dec. 3, 2005).
20. An interesting example of screening out consumers who are not serious enough is the
process students must go through in order to be admitted to top universities. Top U.S. law schools
require that students invest a lot of effort in submitting their applications, including an essay re
quirement, detailed forms, and much more. It is true that some of these requirements are truly
needed for evaluating the candidates as potential students. We suspect, however, that occasionally
some of the requirements are not necessary, except for the purpose of assuring that the candidate
"means business" and is less likely to withdraw his candidacy at a later stage. An alternative way to
assure the candidate's seriousness would be to charge him a fine if he withdraws, or to require a
deposit to ensure the admission, but sometimes this solution is impractical, especially when the
harm from late withdrawal is relatively high. Moreover, it would be difficult and costly to distin
guish cases of financial hardship, in which such fines may be inappropriate.
2 1 . This information can be verified from the list of law reviews that appears at ExpressO's
website. ExpressO is a service provided by Bepress for multiple submissions of papers to U.S. law
reviews. See ExpressO, http:tnaw.bepress.com/expresso/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2005). To be sure, it
could be that the appearance of ExpressO reduced the transaction costs involved in multiple submis
sions and also reduced the difference between the transaction costs born by foreign and domestic
authors.
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relatively high transaction costs are non-U .S. writers who bear higher mail

ing costs than their U.S. colleagues and other writers who bear mailing and

other administrative costs themselves, costs which full-time professors usu
ally shift to their universities. Notice that the multiple-submission system
encourages concurrently submitting a paper to fifty or more law reviews,

entailing very high administrative costs. Those who frequently submit to law
reviews must be either writers who are very optimistic about the likelihood

that their papers will be published, or writers who are able to shift all, or
most, of the costs to others. The latter group consists mainly of U.S. (and

some European and other) professors. If belonging to these two groups is a
good proxy for the quality of the writer and the paper, the hard-copy re

quirement could be considered by some as appropriate. But is it a good

proxy? Admittedly, there could be other explanations for the hard-copy re

quirement, such as the possibility that the law review is attempting to shift

the costs of printing the documents to the author, due to the law review's

budget constraints, coupled with the need to review hard, rather than elec

tronic, copies. Nevertheless, even where the motivation for the practice is
not one of screening out, the screening out effect mentioned above may re
main intact.

Note that using transaction costs and standard-form contracts to screen

out unwanted consumers could be sustainable even when the supplier faces

intense competition from other suppliers. First, in some cases, such as the

ethnic-discrimination examples, consumers the supplier wishes to retain do
not bear considerable transaction costs, and therefore competing suppliers

could not steal such consumers on account of such transaction costs. Sec

ond, even in cases in which consumers the supplier wishes to retain do bear

some transaction costs, they usually enjoy the fact that other consumers are

excluded. Accordingly, they may well prefer the supplier to competing sup
pliers who do not screen out unwanted consumers via transaction costs.
B. Price Discrimination
Uniform goods and services are normally sold to consumers at uniform

prices. A specific consumer's willingness to pay does not affect the price he
pays. For obvious reasons, the supplier of uniform goods and services may

find it beneficial to discriminate in prices in order to extract more surplus

from consumers. However, price discrimination relating to uniform goods is

sometimes prohibited by law. Even when price discrimination is permitted,

the supplier could find it hard to implement. One main reason is that on
many occasions a consumer's willingness to pay is unobservable to the sup

plier or the costs of verifying it are very high. Therefore, suppliers try to use
proxies for consumers' willingness to pay. To illustrate, airlines charge con
sumers higher prices for short stays in the passenger's destination than for

long stays. A possible explanation is that most short-journey travelers are
businesspeople, while most long-journey travelers are people traveling on

vacation, and on average, the former group, or their employers, are willing
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Another common example is the

use of coupons. Only consumers who collect coupons and bring them to the
store will get a discount, while others will pay the regular price. On average,
people who spend time collecting coupons are less willing to pay than peo
23
ple who do not do it, and only the former group will get lower prices.

We claim here that a useful way to price discriminate is through boiler

plate provisions and the imposition of transaction costs via standard-form
contracts.

1 . Beneficial Terms
Example

4.

Special Discount.

Supplier who sells TV sets offers, in a boi

lerplate provision, a special discount to consumers who fill out a certain
form and mail it back to the supplier. Only consumers who read the boiler

plate carefully and remember to fill out the form and mail it enjoy the
special discount.

Many consumers would not pay too much attention to the special dis
count since they are willing to buy the product for its posted price. Such
consumers do not explore the boilerplate provisions in order to find benefits
such as the special discount. On the other hand, consumers who are not will

ing to pay the posted price are more likely to read the boilerplate provisions

to look for benefits such as a special discount.

Example 4 represents cases where certain boilerplate provisions are
beneficial only to consumers who are ready to incur the transaction costs the

supplier imposed upon them, and typically those consumers are the ones
less willing to pay. In Example 4, the transaction costs are the costs of read

ing, understanding, and remembering the special discount hidden in the

boilerplate. The supplier hides the beneficial term in the boilerplate because

he wants to benefit only consumers who would not have bought the goods at

the posted price absent the beneficial term. If the beneficial terms had been
more salient, many consumers, whose decision to enter the contract was not

contingent upon receiving the benefits, would have also received them, and

the supplier's overall profits would have been diminished.

There are many examples of cases in which consumers who are ready to

incur the transaction costs receive an immediate price reduction. Thus, Ba
rak, an international call carrier in Israel, offers special rates to consumers

who call the carrier and sign up, while if they use the carrier without signing

22. Andrew G. Celli, Jr. & Kenneth M. Dreifach, Postcards from the Edge: Surveying the
Digital Divide, 20 CAROOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 66 (2002); see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud
Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1216
(200 1 ).
23. See, e.g. , Eitan Gerstner & James D. Hess, A Theory of Channel Price Promotions, 81
AM. EcoN. REv. 872 (1991) (examining rebates as a possible tool for price discrimination); Hal R.
Varian, A Model of Sales, 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 651 ( 1 980) (forming one of the pioneering economic
models showing that suppliers can price discriminate between informed and uninformed buyers).
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up they would pay rates approximately three times higher!24 We suspect that

the carrier tries to understate these benefits, hiding them from consumers
who use the carrier's services anyway, without signing up. Consequently,
there are many consumers who use the carrier's services for many years, not

being aware of the very special rates they can get by making one short
25
phone call. These consumers are probably the ones who care less about
their money or care more about their time (or are just careless?), and there

fore are more willing to pay. Alternatively, they may be one-time consumers

who find it prohibitively costly to invest in transaction costs when they have

very little at stake.
An analogous example is hiding a best-price guarantee in the boiler

plate.26 In this example, the supplier undertakes in the boilerplate provision

to match any competing offer given by another supplier. Another example is

the case of selling goods with an option to return them and get a refund if

24. The carrier describes the discounted rates on its Internet site as its regular rates. Within a
list of boilerplate conditions it mentions that these rates apply only to those who signed up. For
details in Hebrew, see 013 Barak, Le�oat:i Prati-Ta'arifei Sil:lot [Private Subscriber-Calling
Rates], http://www.Ol3.net/heb/ (follow "Ta'arifon Sil:lot" link) (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
25. This example is based on personal experience. A similar example concerns using toll
roads. We found out that a driver can receive a twenty percent discount for using a toll road in Israel
if the driver, before using the road, calls a specific number in advance and signs up. W hen the driver
calls and signs up, he has to fill out a form promising to pay via credit card and to agree that his
license-plates will be videotaped. A discount of forty percent is available for drivers who call and
agree to install an on-board unit on their cars. At first blush, such a procedure could lower the col
lection costs of the firm managing the toll road and explain the benefit. However, since the fines for
delayed payments are extremely high, the firm does not have a strong economic incentive to encour
age clients to sign up. For details in Hebrew, see Derech Eretz Highways Mgmt Corp. Ltd, Kvish 6
[Highway 6] (2002), http://www.kvish6.co.il/ (follow "Hitstarfut Kemanui [Joining as a Member]"
link). A similar example can be found in ECG, a U.S. long-distance call carrier, which
offers a significant discount for interstate calls to clients who fill out a long enrollment form. See
Enhanced Communication Group, ECG Secure Order, https://myecgaccount.com/order/?sid=
KZzk2uoxb2js5gAZTm1U8MG07hBPiHaz&page=qualify (last visited Nov. 30, 2005).
26. Circuit City, an electronics retailer, makes the following guarantee in its "Terms of Use,"
found by following a link appearing in the fine print at the bottom of the site: "If you've seen a
lower advenised price from a local store with the same item in stock, we want to know about it.
Bring it to our attention, and we'll gladly beat their price by 10% of the difference. Even after your
Circuit City purchase, if you see a lower advenised price (including our own sale prices) within 30
days, we'll refund 110% of the difference." Circuit City, Imponant Legal Information (Nov. 2005),
http://www.circuitcity.com/ccd/lookLeam.do?cat=-133 l 7&edOid=l 05469&c=l . Before the Good
Guys, another electronics retailer, were subsumed by Circuit City, they also guaranteed prices: "If
you find a lower verifiable delivered price (before tax) from bestbuy.com, circuitcity.com, or Crutch
field.com, on an available product of the same brand and model, we'll gladly match that price . . . .
Or, if within 30 days . . . of your purchase from goodguys.com, you find a lower verifiable delivered
price from bestbuy.com, circuitcity.com, or crutchfield.com, on an available product of the same
brand and model, we'll refund the difference." T he Good Guys, Low Price Guarantee, at
http://web.archive.org/web/20041009231528/http:l/thegoodguys.com/help.asp (archived Oct. 9,
2004). For a discussion of the competitive effects of low-price guarantees, see Aaron S. Edlin, Do
Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices, and Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?,
111 HARV. L. REV. 528 (1997). Edlin also points out that low-price guarantees enable price dis
crimination between customers who are aware of the guarantee and are willing to cite a competing
price and other consumers. Our additional insight is that suppliers may want to "hide" their Iow
price guarantees in boilerplate language, rather than making them salient, so that only the panicu
larly price-sensitive consumers would use the guarantees.

996

Michigan Law Review

later the consumer changes his mind for any reason.

[Vol. 1 04:983

27

In recent years some

stores have offered consumers, in their boilerplate terms, the option to return
2
a good even after a few years and get a discounted refund. 8 Probably many
consumers are not aware of these options, or do not care much about their
existence. Others do care, and sometimes use the option to their benefit.
Hiding such benefits from consumers who do not incur the transaction costs

(of reading, understanding, and remembering the beneficial term) is a com
29
mon strategy used by many suppliers, and results in price discrimination. A

similar practice is common in subscription sales. For example, Internet ser

vice providers often have a boilerplate provision granting customers signing

up an option to cancel within a certain period of time and get their money
30
back. Many customers are not aware of this option, hidden in the boiler
plate provision, and therefore do not use it. Probably those who are more
hesitant about signing up would tend to incur the transaction costs and ex

plore all the terms of the contract offered to them. They will be the ones
taking advantage of the benefit.

The discussion thus far implies that at least three types of consumers

will incur the transaction costs of reading, understanding, and remembering

27. Even though such a practice is very common in the United States and many suppliers
will refund the returned goods even without an explicit undertaking, in other countries, absent such
a term, the price for the goods will not be refunded.An example of such a term can be found in the
boilerplate of BigNet, an Israel i company that sells internet domains. BigNet offers a full refund
within thirty days to unsatisfied customers. BigNet, l:favilot Il:isun [Storage Packages] ( 1 999),
http://bignet.co.il/articles/showArticle.asp?menu_id=60. A similar provision can be found in the
terms of sale of an Israeli electronics retailer, E-Net, which promises a full refund for some of its
products returned within fourteen days for any reason.See E-Net, Ma'arekhet Yeshivah Me'or Amiti
Dgam CHERRY [Authentic Leather Seating Set, Cherry Model], http://www.e-net.co.il/
product.asp?productid=4966&CatCode= (last visited Jan.9, 2006).The same provision is offered by
Sakal, another electronics retailer. Sakal, Salon 'Or Niftal:i Me'or Napah Garox 3+2 [Garox
3+2 Napa Leather Partially Reclining Living Room Set], http://www.sakal.co.il/jsp/pg/
Product.jsp?comp=l &sec=2&prod=69535&saleNo=l 009431 (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).
28. This observation is based on the personal experiences of one of the authors regarding
several stores in Chicago. Unfortunately, he does not recall the identity of the store or the products
purchased under these conditions, which proves our point!
29. Some analogous examples: Data Vision, an electronics retailer, suggests in its Terms of
Sale that you, as a customer, can "contact your datavis.com account manager for our most current
and competitive rates, options and shipping specials." Data Vision, Terms and Conditions of
Sale (2001), https://www.datavis.com/webapp/commerce/command/ExecMacro/Datavision/macros/
statics/termsofsale.d2w/report. Similarly, Novell suggests that customers interested in additional
support visit the relevant site: "For more information on Novell's current support offerings, see
Novell, http://support.novell.com." Novell, Novell Software License Agreement, http://
forge.novell.com/modules/xfcontent/file.php/nvds/DEPENDENCIES.html (last visited Jan. 1 0,
2006). MPC, another electronics retailer, offers credit in its boilerplate for the return of replaced
parts: "MPC will issue a credit to you for the return of parts being replaced from the new Product
being upgraded or downgraded.Your request for a credit must be made (and a Returned Merchan
dise Authorization [RMA] number issued) within the time periods set forth ... ." MPC, Terms and
Conditions of Sale (Aug. 30, 2004), http://www.rnpccorp.com/about/legal/terms_and_conditions_
of_sale.html.
30. See, for example, the boilerplate terms of sale of Speakeasy, which offers broadband
Internet services: "Speakeasy offers a 25-day Trial Period on all ADSL services ... . If you feel that
you must cancel within 25 calendar days of your Activation Date you may do so without being
subject to a Disconnection Fee." Speakeasy, Terms of Service (Sept. 28, 2005),
http://www.speakeasy.net/tos/.
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the beneficial boilerplate terms. These are the consumers who care more
about their money, care less about their time, or have more to gain from in
curring the transaction costs. As noted, these are also the consumers who are
typically induced to purchase the product on account of the beneficial boi

lerplate provision, while other consumers would buy the product regardless
of the beneficial provision. Of course, this proxy of consumers' willingness

3
to pay is an imperfect one. 1 In particular, some customers who do not incur
the transaction costs would not be willing to pay the posted price absent the
benefits. Conversely, some customers who incur the transaction costs would
buy the product even absent the benefits but nevertheless incur them because

they gain more than others from doing so or are more sophisticated and
well-informed consumers.

Conferring benefits only upon those who know how to appreciate them

is the mirror image of the familiar use of harsh boilerplate terms set by the

supplier in order to extract surplus from consumers without them being

aware of it. In both cases, the supplier incorporates a boilerplate term or

terms, hoping that many consumers will not be able to estimate the negative

or positive effect on their rights. In the beneficial-terms case, however, it

seems that those who do not appreciate the beneficial terms and therefore do

not receive them, cannot argue that their expectations were frustrated: they
got exactly what they expected to get. This is in contrast to the familiar use

of harsh boilerplate terms, where the main concern is that the consumer ex

pected a different contract than the one she actually got. Later we discuss

the legal implications of the similarities and differences between these two
32
cases.

2. Complexity
Example 5 illustrates how price discrimination through boilerplate pro-

visions could also discriminate in favor of sophisticated consumers.

Example 5. Cellular Packages.33 A cellular firm offers a menu

of packages:

each package differs from the others with regard to rate per minute,
monthly fee, night rate, rates related to text messages (SMS rates), and so

31.

Indeed, as

infra

Section V.A reveals, the welfare effects of discrimination via boilerplate

provisions hinge on the degree and direction of this proxy's imperfection.

32.

A practice related to hiding benefits in the boilerplate is placing harsh terms in the boi

lerplate while allowing readers to avoid these terms. This way, the supplier could extract even more
surplus from nonreaders, who believe they are buying a better product than they actually are. The
supplier may hesitate to price discriminate in this manner, however, out of the fear of legal interven
tion.

33.

In a similar vein, consider the various packages offered by credit card companies-low

interest credit cards, offering

0% introductory APR's; balance transfer cards, transferring a high

interest balance onto a low APR card; rewards credit cards, rewarding the customer for his pur
chases; cash-back credit cards, allowing the customer to earn cash back on purchases; prepaid debit
cards, controlling spending with prepaid debit cards; credit cards for bad credit; and so forth. For a
comparison between the different packages offered by various credit card firms, see Credit
Cards.com, http://www.creditcards.com/ (last visited Jan.

8, 2006).
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forth, in a way that it is difficult for a consumer to calculate which package
is better.

34

In this example, those who would incur the transaction costs and get the

better deals are probably those who use their cellular phones more and
therefore have more to gain from thoroughly exploring all of the available

options. They could also be the more sophisticated consumers, who can eas
ily understand the differences among the various options and choose the one
most suitable to their needs. One could speculate that one of the reasons for

offering so many packages with so many different features is price discrimi

nation in favor of such customers. According to this theory, the cellular firm

makes things complicated in order to offer better deals to high-volume or
sophisticated users, who would often be more sensitive to the price they are

required to pay. Other users, either because they are less sophisticated, or

because they find the transaction costs prohibitively high since they have
little at stake, might take the services at higher prices and sometimes get

inferior services, without being aware of it.

3. Dependency
At times, the supplier could extract even more surplus from those who
are more willing to pay by increasing transaction costs, through boilerplate

language or otherwise, in order to create dependency of those consumers on

the supplier. Dependency encourages such consumers to ask for the sup
plier's assistance, resulting in the purchase of more services and products.

Common examples are computer accessories and programs, which some

consumers find hard to use without the supplier's assistance. At times, the
need for assistance is a natural consequence of the complexity of the prod

uct. But it sometimes seems that suppliers make things more complex than

necessary. For example, sometimes manuals for computer applications seem
5
to be inaccessible to unsophisticated users. 3 The same phenomenon is ap

parent with respect to do-it-yourself products. W hile experienced consumers

would be able to handle the accompanying instructions, which might be

made artificially complex, and assemble the product, less experienced con

sumers would not be able to do so and would ask (and pay) for the
3
supplier's assistance. 6

34. Consider, for example, the services offered by U.S. Cellular. U.S. Cellular,
http://www.uscc.com/uscellular/SilverStream/Pages/b_plan.html?zip=96006&mkt=60681 0&tm=O
(last visited Jan. 8, 2006). For a sophisticated comparison between various wireless phones and
plans, see Get Connected, Wireless Phones and Plans, http://www.getconnected.com/v_wireless/
w_common_geography.asp?caller=/v_wireless/index.asp%3Ftag%3Dp I %26 (last visited Nov. 30,
2005).
35. The "Help" devices of Microsoft Office programs are too complicated for some users,
who would prefer to pay for support or to learn about operation of the programs in special courses.
36. See, for example, a statement by IKEA that "IKEA products are generally easy to assem
ble and require no special tools. If you prefer, most IKEA stores can refer you to a reputable,
reasonably priced assembly company that can come to your home to assemble and install our prod
ucts." IKEA, IKEA FAQs, http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_US/customer_service/faq/faq.html#0004
(last visited Nov. 30, 2005). We are not arguing here that IKEA artificially creates such transaction
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Accordingly, making the use of products artificially more complex re
sults in price discrimination between sophisticated and unsophisticated, or
experienced and inexperienced, consumers. Assuming that in these kinds of
cases the unsophisticated (or inexperienced) consumers are less sensitive to
the price they are required to pay, or less aware of the additional price they
would have to pay for the supplier's assistance, the supplier could extract
payments from these consumers that she would not have been able to extract
but for the transaction costs she artificially created. At the same time, the
supplier manages to retain sophisticated consumers with less willingness to
3
pay. 7 As with the case in which benefits are hidden in boilerplate provi
sions, here the "benefit" enjoyed by those willing and able to incur the
transaction costs involved in reading and understanding the instructions is
the ability to save the additional payment to the supplier for additional ser
vices.

4. Price Discrimination and Competitive Pressures
Could these forms of price discrimination through boilerplate terms sur
vive competitive pressures? If nonreaders of boilerplate provisions also do
not take the time to compare suppliers' competing offers, then no matter
how many suppliers compete with each other, there is no point in setting
competitive terms in the salient part of their contracts, because nonreaders
38
of boilerplate provisions do not compare suppliers anyway. This implies
that if a large enough number of nonreaders of boilerplate provisions do not
compare competing suppliers, hiding benefits in boilerplate provisions in
duces the supplier to raise the price he charges nonreaders. It further implies
that this incentive would remain intact regardless of the number of the sup
plier's competitors. In such cases, even absent tacit or explicit collusion
between suppliers, it is in each supplier' s self interest to raise prices above
competitive levels to nonreaders.
However, if a large enough number of nonreaders of boilerplate provi
sions do compare suppliers' offers, competitive pressure between suppliers
could induce suppliers to try to steal nonreaders from one another via the
39
In such a case, discrimination via

salient terms in their contracts.

costs. We are merely referring to the possibility that it could benefit IKEA to do so under certain
circumstances.
37. This could explain why suppliers sometimes use transaction costs and boilerplate lan
guage to create the dependency of some consumers on their additional services rather than explicitly
tying the product and the additional services. With explicit tying, the supplier might lose sophisti
cated consumers, whereas such consumers could be retained when the supplier merely uses
boilerplate language and transaction costs. Another reason could be that an explicit tie-in of the
supplier's product and service is illegal.
38. In economic models of price matching, it has indeed been shown that the discrimination
inherent in price matching-between consumers who cite rival prices and those who do not
survives in markets with many firms and may even be exacerbated the more firms there are in the
market. See Edlin, supra note 26, at 543; 1.P.L. Png & D. Hirshleifer, Price Discrimination Through
Offers to Match Price, 60 J. Bus. 365, 372-74 (1987).
39. See Louis L. Wilde & Alan Schwartz, Equilibrium Comparison Shopping, 46 REv. EcoN.
STUD. 543 (1979) (showing that when a large enough percentage of consumers compare suppliers,
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boilerplate prov1s1ons requires an oligopolistic setting, (that is, that the
number of substantial suppliers competing with each other is small). Such a

market is susceptible to tacit or explicit collusion between suppliers. As we
show in Section 11.C, hiding benefits in boilerplate provisions indeed helps
facilitate such collusion over the terms offered to nonreaders.
Note also that the more artificial and cumbersome are the transaction

costs readers need to incur, the more competing suppliers would tend to re

duce the level of these transaction costs in order to steal readers from one
another. After all, even a reader would prefer a supplier whose special dis

counts, for example, involve less transaction costs, to a supplier whose

special discounts involve more transaction costs. If the market is competi

tive enough and a large enough number of readers exists, such competitive
pressures could reduce the transaction costs imposed on all consumers to

zero, so that discrimination between readers and nonreaders is dissipated. In
this sense, even if many nonreaders do not compare suppliers, discrimina

tion via boilerplate language requires either collusion between suppliers or
at least that suppliers possess some degree of market power. Such market
power could stem, for example, from product differentiation40 or from ca1
pac1ty constramts. 4
•

•

5 . "Drawing " Beneficial Tenns
Thus far, we have discussed price discrimination based on the different
effects transaction costs have on different consumers. The virtue to the sup

plier of this mode of discrimination is that it induces consumers to reveal

themselves as readers or nonreaders of boilerplate provisions. The supplier
uses this revelation to deduce whether a consumer has low or high willing

ness to pay for the product. At times, however, the supplier could do better

by identifying consumers with low willingness to pay in other ways (for

example, according to their behavior in the supplier's shop), and "drawing"
2
the beneficial boilerplate terms in their favor.4

To illustrate the "drawing" mode of price discrimination, we use Exam

ple 4 (special discount). In this example, a TV-set seller incorporates a

suppliers are induced to charge competitive prices). Wilde and Schwartz assume in their model that
each supplier charges all consumers the same price. In contrast, we explore cases in which the sup
plier can charge readers of boilerplate language lower prices than he charges nonreaders. This is
why when most nonreaders also do not compare suppliers, suppliers are induced to raise prices to
nonreaders, notwithstanding competitive pressures.
40. With product differentiation, readers that prefer the supplier's brand to competing brands
will be willing to incur some transaction costs and stick with the supplier's brand. See generally
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 280 (1988).
41. In the case of capacity constraints (that is, constraints on the quantity the supplier is able
to supply, such as limited plant size, limited distribution channels, and so forth), suppliers cannot
reduce transaction costs imposed upon readers to zero, since then they would not have the capacity
to serve all readers that would flow to them. This too grants suppliers some degree of market power.
See generally id. at 215-16.
42. T here also could be particular consumers the supplier wants to benefit for other reasons.
For example, the supplier might fear that some consumers who have not received the benefits would
find out about them later and would retaliate by not transacting with the supplier anymore.
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boilerplate term providing that a consumer who fills out a form and mails it
to the supplier receives a special discount. Instead of hiding this term from
all consumers, hoping the "right" consumers will read and understand it, the
supplier could reveal the provision only to hesitant consumers.
The same tactic could be used by the supplier in Example 5 (the cellular
packages), and also in cases where the supplier intends to offer beneficial
terms to new consumers or to old consumers who consider switching to an
other supplier, but not to old consumers who do not consider such a switch.
Instead of explicitly limiting the applicability of the beneficial terms to new
consumers or those who consider a switch to a new supplier, thereby frus
trating other faithful consumers, the supplier could draw the beneficial terms
from the boilerplate any time she believes it is beneficial for her to do so.
Old consumers who have not received the benefit would sometimes be able
to receive it later after discovering it in the boilerplate, and, in any case, they
would be less frustrated, because they would believe it was their fault (not
noticing the beneficial boilerplate term) and not the supplier's fault (having
offered the beneficial boilerplate term to all consumers). The case of the
43
international-call carriers we discussed above could serve as a possible
illustration also for such cases.
The preceding discussion demonstrates the advantage to the supplier in
incorporating a beneficial boilerplate term and drawing upon it when neces
sary, instead of simply offering it to the appropriate consumers without
incorporating it as a boilerplate term. This way the supplier could avoid re
putational sanctions or retaliation by frustrated consumers who have not
enjoyed the benefits offered to other consumers.
C. Hiding Benefits Granted to Selected Consumers
In Section l.B, we discussed the role of boilerplate language and the
transaction costs generated through it in segmenting consumers for the pur
pose of price discrimination. Here, we deal with a related issue: sometimes
there are privileged consumers who are entitled to benefits beyond what
most consumers expect. These benefits could be granted outside, and inde
pendently of, boilerplate language. Still, the supplier would often like to
understate these benefits in order to avoid frustrating the consumers who do
not receive them. Moreover, sometimes consumers who are aware of the
benefits granted to others but not to them rightly suspect that they may be
subsidizing those benefits by paying more, or receiving less, than the bene
fited consumers. Example 6 illustrates this point.

Example

6.

Frequent-Flyer Miles.

An airline grants privileges to passen

gers for high mileage ("frequent flyers"). Many passengers are not and
will not be entitled to the privileges, since they do not fly frequently
enough. In all of the airline's forms, which establish the legal relation
ship between the airline and the passengers, the privileges for frequent

43.

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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flyers are understated. However, the airline directly mails frequent flyers
all the relevant details concerning the privileges they are entitled to.

In Example 6, the airline might hint in the forms distributed to all con
sumers about the existence of a "frequent flyer" status, urging those who are
44
interested in more details to call the company for further information.
D. Collecting Info rmation about Consumers ' Preferences
As noted, suppliers are often unaware of consumers' willingness to pay
for the product, so they use boilerplate language and transaction costs in
order to induce each consumer to reveal her willingness to pay. Suppliers
would often like consumers to reveal not only their willingness to pay, but
also their preferences. This information helps suppliers market their prod
ucts and services to new consumers, but is also useful in planning the
performance of the contract or future marketing efforts vis-a-vis their exist
ing consumers. Occasionally, boilerplate language and the imposition of
transaction costs could serve as useful and reliable tools for extracting this
information from consumers. In certain cases, the information collected
could be sold to other suppliers, who could use it for their own businesses.
As we will immediately see through Example 7, transaction costs play once
again an important role in achieving the supplier's goals.

Example

7.

Learning the Attractiveness of Services.

A cellu lar phone

company is interested in learning the attractiveness to consumers of vari
ous services. To achieve this goal, the company makes these services
available to consumers, conditioned upon some transaction costs they
must incur in order to get these services. For example, the company
could ask consumers to order services through a process that requires
them to read and learn instructions placed in boilerplate language, to fill
45

out long and time-consuming forms, and so forth.

44. Northwest Airlines, for example, grants its frequent fliers significant benefits and dis
counts, but the client has to fill out a special form in order to enroll as a frequent flier, and the
enrollment information is not prominent on Northwest's Internet site. Nw. Airlines, Enroll in
WorldPerks-U.S. Residents, https://www.nwa.com/cgi-bin/wp_enroll.pro?Country=US (last vis
ited Dec. 6, 2005). A similar practice is adopted by American Airlines. Am. Airlines,
Advantage Terms & Conditions, https://www.aa.com/content/AAdvantage/programDetails/
termsAndConditions/termsAndConditions.jhtml (last visited Dec. 6, 2005). Anecdotal evidence
suggests that frequent fliers of these airlines receive more salient information via direct mail.
Similarly, an Israeli virtual "mall," Nana Shops, declares in its boilerplate Terms of Sale that
the customers of the Internet provider Netvision are entitled to special privileges from time to time.
Terms of Sale, art. 15, http://www.nanashops.co.il/disclaimer.php (last visited Jan. 3 1 , 2006). Analo
gous examples are the exclusive "Platinum" and "Gold" clubs offered by different credit card
companies to their VIP customers. For instance, see the long forms required to apply for a Blue
Cash card-an exclusive American Express credit card. American Express, Get Blue, https://
www66.americanexpress.com/cards/Applyfservlet?csi=38nOI l /b/57/23294 15368/232032305522/
O/n&PID=l &EAID=EhraRx8K%2FBE-gRzAzq6fakkj%2AuCJ wExC4g&CRTV=CCGBLUOOOO
1 102&PSKU=CCGBLU&afflSID=EhraRx8K%2FBE (last visited Jan. 9, 2006).

45. See, for example, the membership forms of DriverGuide, a web site that enables mem
bers to download drivers for various computer programs. The service is free of charge, but in order
to download a driver, the user must become a member. As part of the registration process, the web
site offers different computer products, some of which are free of charge. In order to proceed with

March 2006]

Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts 1 003

Had the cellular phone company not conditioned the availability of the

various services upon incurring the transaction costs, most consumers would
order these services and the cellular phone company would know very little

about their preferences. Arguably, the company could collect payment for
each service, even a small one, thereby achieving the same goal at a lower
cost (or even with a gain) to itself. But even if this strategy could be useful
on some occasions, the strategy of imposing transaction costs described in
Example 7 could be more useful on other occasions. First, in some cases the
company would find it too costly to monitor each and every use of the ser
vice and then calculate the appropriate payment for such use. But more

importantly, the main advantage of the imposition of transaction costs over

charging a payment is that many consumers would be willing to bear the
transaction costs but not to pay the cellular phone company for additional

services it offers. This is so not only because many people care more about
their money than they care about their time,46 but also because consumers
might not trust a company that asks to be paid for such services, suspecting

that the company is trying to make additional profits at their expense. Learn

ing about consumers' preferences for different services via transaction costs

rather than via payment for services can thus be seen as an aggressive com
petitive move on the part of the cellular phone company: the additional

services are granted free of charge, while the transaction costs are used to
ensure that only consumers especially interested in a service would use it.

A cheap and reliable way to learn about consumer preferences is through

the Internet. In cases where consumers are required to surf from one link to

another to search for the goods or the services they want to buy, thereby

incurring transaction costs, it is relatively easy to track a consumer's moves

from one page to another and learn about her preferences even if eventually
she buys nothing.47
II. PREVENTION OF COMPETITION AND CARTEL STABILIZATION
A. Introduction: When Is Tacit Collusion Sustainable ?
In many industries, particularly oligopolies (that is, industries with only
a few substantial firms), tacit or explicit collusion becomes possible.48 W hile

explicit collusion can often be deterred by antitrust law, it is well known that

firms can sustain a cartel-like price even absent explicit communication
the registration process, the user must click "yes" or "no" near the product icon.In addition, the user
must answer which newsletters containing special offers and discounts she wishes to receive. The
user specifies her fields of interest by clicking on the relevant fields and by deciding which product
she wishes to receive free of charge at the end of the process.The possibility of skipping the process
of choosing the newsletters and the free item is provided in fine print, not reasonably observable to
many users. See DriverGuide, supra note 13.
46.

See Duxbury et al., supra note 15.

47. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 471-72 (arguing that businesses that use the
Internet collect a tremendous amount of data on their potential consumers-including their willing
ness to read and shop for terms-and may use it, among other things, for price discrimination).
48.

See, e.g., TiROLE, supra note 40, at 239-70.
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9
between them (hereinafter, tacit collusion).4 This is because, given that all

firms charge a collusive price, each firm faces a trade-off between the short

term gain that it could make by deviating from the collusive price and stealing

market share from its rivals and the long-term loss that would evolve from the
so
If all firms are such that their long-term

price war that would be triggered.

loss from a price war outweighs their short-term gain from cutting prices,

tacit collusion becomes sustainable, to the detriment of consumers. If, on the

other hand, one or more of the firms finds price cutting so profitable that it
outweighs the long-term loss from a price war, tacit collusion breaks down,

and competitive pricing evolves. In fact, the firm most eager to cut prices is

the only firm whose incentives matter. If it prefers to cut prices, collusion
st
breaks down, and if it prefers not to cut prices, collusion is sustainable.
s2
Antitrust agencies call such firms "maverick firms."

Note that the industry maverick's eagerness to cut prices may be more of

a vice than a virtue. The maverick's gains from price cutting can be pro

duced only if a collusive price is in place. However, since the maverick's

rivals often know of its eagerness to cut prices, they may well refrain from
charging a collusive price to begin with, if they fear that the maverick would

then undercut this price and steal their customers. In such cases, collusion is
not sustainable, and all firms, including the maverick, usually earn lower
profits than they could have earned had collusion been sustainable.

Accordingly, the maverick could raise its profits by making collusion

sustainable. In order to do so, it needs to commit to becoming less eager to
cut prices.

In what follows, we shall show how boilerplate provisions in contracts

or the imposition of transaction costs could be used to facilitate explicit or
tacit collusion.

B. Making It Difficult to Compare among Rivals
Firms in various industries often tend to make the terms of sale included

in their boilerplate provisions complicated and difficult for consumers to
understand or assess. We claim that such complexity can harm competition.

Let us illustrate by using the following example:

49. Although earlier cases may have been understood as considering mere parallel pricing as
an agreement violating section 1 of the Sherman Act, see, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 ( 1939), it
became clear in later cases that absent some evidence of communication or coordination, the agree
ment requirement of this section is not met. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 541 ( 1954); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'JI 75,253 (E.D.
Mich. 1 974).
50.

See supra note 48.

51. See David Gilo, The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. I,
17-18 (2000); David Gilo, Yossi Moshe & Yossi Spiegel, Panial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collu
sion, 37 RAND J. EcoN. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 13, on file with author).
52.
1992).

See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57

FED. REG.

41,553, 4 1,559-60 (Sept. JO,
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8.

Complex Cellular Contracts.

Two cellular firms, firm A and

firm B, compete and both offer a menu of packages : each package differs
from the others with regard to factors such as rate per minute, monthly fee,
night rate, SMS rates, and so forth, in a way that makes it difficult for a
consumer to calculate which supplier offers a better deal.

In the following subsections, we shall discuss three anticompetitive ef
fects that could stem from such complexity of contracts. The first is the
facilitation of collusion, the second is the raising of prices even absent col
lusion, and the third is entry deterrence.

1 . Facilitation of Collusion
The complexity of the contracts in Example 8 could contribute to the
stability of noncompetitive terms. If both cellular firms offer noncompetitive
terms, the profits one of them could make by offering more competitive
terms are small, since many consumers would find it difficult to assess
whether the complex terms offered by their current cellular provider are
better than the competing offer. For example, suppose firm A tries to offer a
benefit with regard to one or some of its packages. How can a customer of

firm B know if firm A is offering him a better deal? In order to do so, tedi
ous calculations are needed. Even if she manages to learn which of A's
packages is best for her, she needs to assess all of the parameters in B ' s
packages and compare them with the way A's offer deals with these issues.
The customer does not want to make a hasty decision since she typically has
to incur costs in switching suppliers.
Accordingly, many consumers would hesitate to move from firm B to

firm A. This makes a price cut or other competitive benefit offered by A
much less profitable. Not only is A possibly triggering a costly price war in
the long run, but the gain it could make by stealing customers in the short
run may be very small. To be sure, A could try to advertise and explain in
detail how all of its possible packages are better than all of B's packages,
but such an offer would be costly. Note that the most profitable way to devi
ate from collusive terms is to offer only a slight benefit compared to the
rival with a hope of stealing as many of the rival's customers as possible.
But with complex contracts, a slight and subtle benefit cannot steal many
customers, because they fail to assess it. In order to offer consumers a sim
ple deal that is bluntly better than each and every one of B 's different and
various packages, A would need to offer an extreme benefit. But while offer
ing a large benefit compared to B could steal substantial market share from
B, A's profits per unit made during the price cut would be much lower than
53
those A makes during collusion. The less profitable such a defection from
collusion becomes, the less likely it is to overcome the expected long-term

53. An alternative strategy for A could be to offer a simple contract with what A knows to be
a subtle improvement compared to B. However, many customers would not switch to A merely
because his contract is simple, and would require a value-based comparison before switching. As
noted, such a comparison is prohibitively costly when B's contract is complex.
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losses from the price war that would follow. B would be similarly less in
clined to cut prices. The same goes for A and B 's incentives to compete over
new customers. If a new customer finds it impossible to compare the two
offers, there is no need for them to compete over her.
Note that unlike consumers, firms A and B would not find it hard to as
sess whether their rival has deviated from a collusive equilibrium. After all,
A and B are sophisticated and have a lot at stake. Accordingly, it cannot be
said that contract complexity could make A and B more eager to cut prices,
because their rival would not know about the price cut. As long as deviat!on
from a collusive scheme is made vis-a-vis end consumers, it is readily de
54

tectable by a rival firm, regardless of contract complexity.

Such complex contracts support an equilibrium in which competition is
less fierce, and profits, accordingly, higher. Note that this effect of contract
complexity exists whether or not suppliers mean it to facilitate collusion. It
could be that contracts are complex for other reasons. Still, the effect is the
55
same: improved sustainability of collusive terms.
We found several examples of oligopolistic markets in which competing
suppliers offer extremely complex contracts. Cellcom, for example, the
56
leading Israeli cellular provider, with a thirty-four percent market share,
has given consumers an option to elect one of seven different packages.
Consumers may switch between these packages at will at no extra cost. The
packages differ from each other (some only slightly) with regard to various
parameters, including the monthly fixed fee; rate per minute; number of
people that the consumer may call at a cheaper rate per minute; times of day
or days in which the rate is lower; number of minutes per month above
which the rate per minute is lower; the rates for additional services such as
SMS messages, downloads, ringtones, or Internet; the rates for calls to other
networks or fixed line phones; and so forth. Each of the packages features,
on average, nine parameters needed in order to calculate the attractiveness
of the package. Similarly complex are the packages sold by Orange, Cell
com's rival of almost equal size, with a thirty-two percent market share.
Orange has seventeen different packages that again, on average, require the
consumer to assess nine different parameters in order to calculate the value
of the deal he will obtain. Two of the packages are displayed in a forty-six
column, fifty-three row table.

54. It could be claimed that the collusive scheme itself is more difficult for A and B to coor
dinate when contracts are complex. However, in an oligopolistic setting, once, at a certain stage, A
and B 's packages are supracompetitive (say because one of them introduced such packages and the
other tacitly followed by offering such packages), they would be less likely to deviate and offer
competitive packages.
55. That said, if indeed the complexity of the contracts facilitates collusion, suppliers should
probably be presumed to intend, or at least take account of, the reasonable effects of their behavior.
56. The data was taken from YNET, an electronic newspaper. Posting of Omri Levi to
http://www.ynet.co.il/home/l , 7340,L-876- 1 805 1 - 1 290891 1 ,00.html (July 28, 2005, 2 1 :28 Israeli
time).

March 2006]

Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts 1007

Similar complexities exist in other markets, such as some long-distance
57

and cellular phone markets in the United States .

2. Raising Prices Even Absent Collusion
Interestingly, complexity of contracts also typically raises the prices that
would prevail absent collusion. As is well known, in markets with only a
few firms, even absent ongoing collusion, prices will often exceed marginal
costs. Common reasons for this are product differentiation (that is, consum
58
and capacity

ers do not see the competing products as perfect substitutes)

constraints (that is, firms are not able to lower prices all the way down to
59
marginal costs, due to their capacity constraints).
Consumers' difficulties in fully understanding the value they get from a
supplier, and their consequent difficulties in comparing suppliers, can enable
suppliers in such industries, even absent collusion, to raise prices even fur
ther above marginal costs. Suppose, for example, that in the market
discussed in Example 8, the equilibrium price when contracts are easy to
understand is $ 1 0 per unit. That is, none of the cellular firms wishes to raise
its price above $ 10, because they fear that then too many consumers would
prefer the competing supplier, and the supplier attempting the price raise
would lose too many customers to justify the elevated profit per unit.
Now suppose, however, that the cellular firms change their contracts so
that it becomes more difficult for consumers to compare between them. It is
quite intuitive that this would give the cellular firms the power to profitably
raise prices, say, to $ 1 1 per unit. If firm A, for example, charges $ 1 1 al
though firm B charges only $ 10, many of the consumers would find it hard
to verify that the deal they receive from A, weighed according to all of its
other complex parameters, is worse than the deal they get from B . Even
though B ' s price per unit is somewhat lower, many consumers would not
switch to it. This could make the price hike by A profitable. The same goes
6()
Indeed,

for firm B, which may also find it profitable to charge $ 1 1 per unit.

various economic models find that elevated search costs, which consumers

57.

See CONSUMER &

FED. COMMC'Ns CoMM'N, CELL PHONES:
THE MARKET (2002), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
cgb/cell_phones.html (noting that choosing a cellular phone plan can be overwhelming, and review
ing factors important to consumers in selecting a plan). The complexity of the cellular phone market
is prominent in the various sites comparing the cellular package offered by different cellular provid
ers. See, e.g. , Consumer Search, Wireless Plans Reviews, http://www.consumersearch.com/www/
electronics/wireless-plans-reviews/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2006); Phone Dog, Free Cell Phones &
Great Specials, http://www.phonedog.com/cell-phone-shopping/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 8,
2006); Wireless Guide, Comparison Shopping for Cell Phones, http://www.wirelessguide.org/
phone/comparison-shopping.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2006). Such sites could be viewed as a market
reaction to deal, although imperfectly, with the extreme complexity of firms' contracts.
Gov'TAL AFFAIRS BUREAU,

HELPING CONSUMERS MAKE SENSE OF

58.

See TiROLE, supra note 40, at 294-95.

59.

See id. at 209-38; see also supra note 4 1 .

60. This also applies to nonprice terms of the contract. When contracts are complex, suppli
ers are less hesitant to offer poorer nonprice terms, as they do not expect to lose much market share
when they do so.
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need to bear in order to compare between competing suppliers, have the
effect of raising prices in oligopolies, even absent ongoing collusion.61
Interestingly, the effect of raising prices absent collusion may serve to

help collusion break down and thus counteracts the effect discussed in Sec
tion II.B. l , above. This is because if complexity of contracts raises prices

and profits absent collusion, and if firms charge such prices when collusion

breaks down, the long-term losses they suffer from a price war would be
smaller, and they would be less hesitant to cut prices. According to this rea

soning, complexity of contracts may have an ambiguous effect on the

prospects of collusion: on the one hand, as identified in Section II.B. l , it
makes collusion more sustainable by lowering the short-term gains from

price cutting. On the other hand, as identified in the current Section, it
makes collusion less sustainable, by lowering the long-term loss from the

price war that evolves when collusion breaks down. Two caveats are in
place, however. First, it is quite unlikely that firms would make their con
tracts

artificially

complex

if

this

causes

collusion

to

break

down.

Accordingly, if we observe artificially complex contracts, it is plausible to

assume that either collusion is sustainable or that it would be unsustainable

even absent the complexity. Second, as some economic studies show, firms
may be able to adopt strategies in which price wars are more painful than a

mere reversion to the prices that would have evolved in equilibrium absent
collusion. 62 For example, during a price war, contracts could become simple
and profits accordingly lower. If such strategies are adopted, only the collu

sion facilitating effect of complexity remains.

3. Entry Deterrence
Complexity of contracts can also serve as a barrier to entry of new firms

into the market. Suppose that a new entrant, firm C, wishes to enter the
market portrayed in Example 8. Firm C would find it hard to steal customers

away from the incumbent cellular firms, because their customers would find
it hard to verify that firm C is indeed offering them a better deal. Firm C

could make an effort to explain its advantages to consumers, but this would
be costly and possibly ineffective, and would, again, reduce the expected
profits from entry, and make it less likely. 63

6 1 . See Simon P. Anderson & Regis Renault, Pricing, Product Diversity, and Search Costs:
A Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model, 30 RAND J. EcoN. 7 1 9 ( 1999) (showing that prices in
oligopoly rise when search costs rise). These results have also been supported empirically. See
Christopher R. Knittel, Interstate Long Distance Rates: Search Costs, Switching Costs, and Market
Power, 1 2 RE V. INous. 0RG. 5 1 9 ( 1 997) (showing that search costs and switching costs have en
abled long-distance carriers in the United States to raise prices after the dissolution of AT&T).
62. See Dilip Abreu, Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames, 39 J.
1 9 1 (1986).

EcoN. THEORY

63. Note that not all firms need to offer complex contracts in order for the anticompetitive
effects of complexity to exist. As long as complexity is abundant enough, it would be useless for a
rival offering a simple contract to try to steal customers from suppliers who offer complex contracts.
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C. How Can Beneficial Boilerplate Terms Facilitate Collusion ?

1 . Collusion over Harsh Boilerplate Terms versus Collusion
with Beneficial Boilerplate Terms
It is understandable that a monopolistic supplier may want to use a
value-reducing boilerplate provision, which many consumers do not read,
hoping that consumers who do not read the provision would be willing to
buy the supplier's product for a relatively high price, while they would not
have bought it for that price had they read the harsh provision. How can
such value-reducing terms be sustained, however, in markets in which more
than one significant supplier compete with each other? In such markets, if
one supplier attempts to include value-reducing boilerplate terms in his con
tracts, the competing supplier may be tempted to highlight this fact in his
advertisements, offer consumers a better deal, and steal them away from the
64
As noted, however, in oligopolistic markets, tacit collusion

first supplier.

over value-reducing terms (or supra-competitive prices) could be sustain
able. Let us illustrate using the following example:

Example

9.

Collusion over Harsh Terms.

Firms Alpha and Beta compete

with each other in selling televisions. They tacitly or explicitly collude
over placing a boilerplate term in their contracts according to which once a
television is bought and used, it is nonrefundable.

The question whether collusion between Alpha and Beta is sustainable
in the current context hinges on the comparison between the parties' short
term gain during a deviation from collusion and their long-term loss from
the price war that would evolve. The short-term gain would involve the prof
its either of them (say, Alpha) could make by highlighting its rival's harsh
boilerplate term, offering refunds for returned televisions, and stealing busi
ness. The price war that would be triggered would involve Beta fighting
back, canceling the value-reducing boilerplate term, and offering refunds or
even more overreaching benefits or price cuts. This would cause the terms
of the suppliers' contracts to be competitive, and in the long run, they would
forego the collusive profits they could have made had collusion not broken
down. If, for both Alpha and Beta, the long-term loss from a price war out
weighs the short-term profit from price cutting, collusion over the harsh
boilerplate term would be sustainable. If, on the other hand, for either Alpha
or Beta, the short-term profit from price cutting outweighs the long-term
loss from a price war, collusion would break down.

64. Unlike us, Korobkin implicitly assumes that the saliency of the terms is given exoge
nously. Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, supra note 5, at 1 206. This drives his conclusion that
"[ w]hile sellers have an economic incentive to provide the efficient level of quality for the attributes
buyers consider ("salient" attributes), they have an incentive to make attributes buyers do not con
sider ("non-salient" attributes) favorable to themselves." Id. Our point in the text, however, is that
the saliency of terms is, for the most part, endogenous: a supplier could snatch business from his
rival by highlighting the rival's harsh nonsalient terms.
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Our next claim, however, is that such tacit collusion over value-reducing
boilerplate terms could be extremely fragile and would often tend to break
down. When such collusion breaks down, another form of collusion would
often be more robust. Under this other form of collusion, suppliers could
offer collusive terms to everyone but the readers of boilerplate provisions,
who would be offered more competitive and attractive terms. This is illus
trated in Example 10:

Example

JO.

Collusion with Beneficial Boilerplate Provisions.

Finns Alpha

and Beta compete with each other in the sale of televisions. They tacitly or
explicitly collude on the terms offered to all consumers, but both offer, in a
boilerplate provision, a special competitive discount to consumers who fill
out a certain form and mail it to the supplier. Only consumers who read the
boilerplate carefully, remember to fill out the form, and mail it enj oy the
special discount.

In what follows, we will explain why this other form of collusion would
be more sustainable, and, at times, also a more profitable way to collude,
than that of Example 9 above. As Section II.A reveals, collusion is more
sustainable the less profitable are the deviations from collusion and the more
profitable is collusion itself (that is, the more harmful are price-wars in
which collusive profits are forgone). With collusion over value-reducing
boilerplate terms, as in Example 9, the short-term gain from deviating from
collusion is the business a supplier is able to steal by highlighting his rival's
value-reducing boilerplate term and offering a better deal. He can then steal
two kinds of consumers: readers of boilerplate terms, who are aware of the
nonrefund clause, and nonreaders of the boilerplate terms, who find out
about the term only when the deviating supplier highlights it. Note that these
5
short-term profits from deviation are potentially large. 6 Not only can devia
tion steal both readers and nonreaders of the boilerplate terms, but
consumers might develop antagonism about a supplier that until then tried to
abuse them via value-reducing boilerplate terms.
In addition, one cannot ignore the harsh legal treatment toward value
reducing boilerplate terms. To the extent that such terms can be invalidated
by law, collusion over them again becomes fragile. It is enough if one of the
suppliers' value reducing boilerplate terms are invalidated by a court for
such collusion to break down. The supplier whose terms were invalidated
would potentially steal market share from rival suppliers; there would be
competitive pressure on these rival suppliers to remove their value-reducing
terms as well, even if they were not attacked in court.
Now consider Example 10, in which suppliers offer collusive terms to
everyone but the readers of boilerplate provisions, who pay the competitive
price thanks to the special discounts. Here, deviating from collusion (that is,
by offering discounts not only to readers of the boilerplate provision, but to
all customers), becomes much less profitable for several reasons. First, such
65. Of course, "large" is a relative term. We shall claim below that the collusion portrayed in
Example 10 is more stable than the collusion portrayed in Example 9, particularly because the prof
its from deviation from the collusion in Example 10 are smaller.
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deviation has the potential of stealing only nonreaders of the boilerplate
provision, since readers of the boilerplate provision already enjoy the spe
6
cial discounts, and thus have no reason to prefer the deviating supplier.6
Second, even the nonreaders of the boilerplate provision would not neces
sarily switch to the deviating supplier. Their original supplier could retain
them by pointing out to them that the special discount was in their contract
(in a boilerplate) all along. This would also minimize consumer antagonism.
Consumers would not feel they have been deceived but merely that they
have not done such a good job at reading their contract. Third, the chance
that deviation is motivated by an attempt to exclude competitors is smaller.
At times, suppliers deviate from collusion because they hope to exclude
their rivals completely by setting terms their rivals cannot match, say, due to
cost constraints. Supplier B eta, in Example 9 above (in which there are col
lusive boilerplate terms), could try to offer salient discounts, or analogous
benefits, in order to try to drive Alpha out of business. However, in situa
tions resembling Example 1 0, in which Alpha is already offering such
beneficial terms in its boilerplate provisions, Beta receives a credible signal
as to how efficient Alpha is and how capable it is of offering benefits to con
sumers. If Alpha has persisted with the beneficial boilerplate provision for a
considerable period, Beta understands that Alpha is capable of granting such
benefits to all consumers if competition becomes fierce. This signal could
deter Beta from trying to exclude Alpha. When exclusion is not an option,
friendly accommodation of Alpha and collusion with it can become the most
67
profitable strategy. Accordingly, deviation from collusion over harsh terms
is more profitable than deviation from collusion with competitive benefits
8
hidden in the boilerplate.6

66. In this sense, hiding benefits in boilerplate language is a stronger facilitator of collusion
than price-matching policies, in which the supplier promises to match a rival's price cut. With price
matching, a price matcher's rival can still make considerable profits from deviating from collusion,
due to consumers' hassle in going to the rival and then back to the price matcher in order to invoke
the price match. See Morten Hviid & Greg Shaffer, Hassle Costs: The Achilles ' Heel of Price
Matching Guarantees, 8 J. EcoN. & MGMT. STRATEGY 489 (1999). In contrast, with hidden benefits
in boilerplate language, the rival cannot steal readers, since they are already enjoying the competi
tive benefits.
67. See generally TIROLE, supra note 40, at 305-42 (discussing the above interaction be
tween exclusion and accommodation of rivals). Note that if Beta is so efficient that he can profitably
undercut even Alpha's beneficiary terms, exclusion would have occurred with or without the benefi
cial boilerplate terms. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the beneficial boilerplate terms can prevent
exclusion of Alpha. All they do is prevent unsuccessful attempts by Beta to exclude Alpha. Argua
bly, Alpha could try to pretend to be more efficient than it really is by having below-cost boilerplate
terms. Alpha could cross-subsidize these below-cost terms via the collusive profits it makes at the
expense of nonreaders of the boilerplate term. This would make Alpha's signal to Beta Jess credible.
Still, Beta should place a positive probability on the risk that Alpha is not selling to boilerplate
readers below cost. After all, such cross-subsidization forgoes a substantial portion of Alpha's collu
sive profits and is therefore costly to Alpha. Accordingly, it is still the case that Beta would be Jess
likely to try and exclude Alpha.
68. To be sure, it also should be examined whether collusion over harsh terms is more profit
able than collusion with beneficial competitive terms, in which case the former may still be more
sustainable than the latter. On the one hand, with the former type of collusion, the supplier loses
many readers, who are retained with the latter type of collusion. On the other hand, ignoring the risk
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2. Collusion with Beneficial Boilerplate Terms versus

Collusion without Such Terms
Competitive beneficial boilerplate terms as in Example 10 make price
cutting less profitable not only compared to the collusion portrayed in Ex
ample 9 (over harsh boilerplate terms), but also compared to a situation
where Alpha and Beta collude on a uniform price without any boilerplate
provisions (either harsh or beneficial). In the latter case, if Alpha and Beta
try to collude on the terms of their contracts, their short-term profits from
deviating from collusion become larger: the deviating supplier can steal all
types of consumers-readers and nonreaders of boilerplate provisions alike.
On the other hand, when they place competitive discounts in their boiler
plate

terms,

as in Example

10, a deviating supplier can steal only

nonreaders. Even nonreaders could remain with their current supplier (with
no hard feelings toward their supplier) if their current supplier immediately
makes it apparent to them that they could have enjoyed the benefits hidden
in their contract all along. Furthermore, as explained above, to the extent a
supplier wishes to deviate from collusion in order to exclude its rival, it is
less likely to do so when suppliers can hide benefits in boilerplate provi
sions.
Finally, the collusive profits when hiding benefits in boilerplate provi
sions may well be larger, due to the fact that without benefits hidden in the
boilerplate, many readers end up not purchasing the product, whereas they
would have purchased it with the hidden benefits. It is true that readers who
do purchase the product when Alpha and Beta collude over a uniform price
pay more than they would have paid had they enjoyed the competitive bene
fits hidden in the boilerplate. Suppliers, however, always have the option of
not hiding benefits in their boilerplate. Hence, if they do so in a particular
case, it could imply that the former effect outweighs the latter effect and that
it is more profitable to suppliers to hide benefits in the boilerplate than not
to do so. Alternatively, it might be that suppliers prefer hiding benefits in the
boilerplate because collusion over a uniform price would break down. One
way or another, when we observe that suppliers chose to hide benefits in
their boilerplate, such a practice always improves the prospects of collusion.
The analysis in this Section could also explain why many suppliers often
include beneficial boilerplate terms in their contracts. In addition to the
profits from discrimination, described in Section LB, such a strategy could
make collusion at the expense of nonreaders of boilerplate provisions more
sustainable.

of legal intervention, with the former type of collusion, the supplier extracts more surplus from
consumers who do decide to purchase from the supplier.
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D. Using Beneficial Boilerplate Terms as a Signaling Device

1 . Encouraging Anticompetitive Accommodation among Rivals
A related feature of beneficial boilerplate terms is that they can be used
to encourage anticompetitive accommodation by rivals. By accommodation,
we mean the opposite of exclusion. Even absent collusion, firms may some

times compete vigorously with the hope of excluding their rivals and
gaining dominance in the market in the long run. If they succeed in doing

so, welfare may be reduced because the structure of the market would be

come less competitive. On the other hand, if they do not succeed in doing
so, and the rivals, rather than being excluded, fight back with beneficial

terms on their own part, welfare is considerably enhanced, as consumers
enjoy extremely beneficial terms from all suppliers. In such cases, a sup
plier's forsaken hope of excluding a rival turns out to be welfare-enhancing.
Our claim here is that including beneficial boilerplate terms in the sup

plier's contracts could be a relatively cheap way to discourage welfare

enhancing (unsuccessful) attempts to exclude rivals. The previous Section

discussed this effect in the context of the sustainability of tacit collusion,

where an attempt to exclude a rival was seen as motivation for deviating

from collusion. Here we wish to stress that this anticompetitive effect could

remain even absent collusion. Take supplier Alpha from Example 10 above,
which offered a beneficial discount only to readers of its boilerplate lan

guage. In doing so, Alpha sends a credible signal that it is efficient and
competent enough to cope with such a discount for a long period. This dis
69
courages Beta from trying to compete vigorously, hoping to exclude Alpha.
Had Beta been in the dark about how far Alpha could go with such competi

tive terms, Beta might have competed vigorously, Alpha would have fought

back by competing vigorously itself, their consumers would have benefited,
70

and Alpha and Beta would have earned lower profits.

2. Entry Deterrence
Beneficial boilerplate terms could also be a device that incumbent firms

use to deter entry of new rivals. The beneficial terms serve as a credible sig

nal of the extent of benefits to consumers that the incumbent firm can cope

with. Consider Example 1 0, in which both Alpha and Beta offer boilerplate

terms with discounts. A potential entrant, G amma, observes these terms and

receives a credible signal as to how far Alpha and Beta could go with re
spect to all consumers in order to fight Gamma if it decides to enter. Absent

69. As noted, supra note 67, although Alpha could try to "cheat" and disguise itself as an
extremely efficient firm by offering below-cost discounts in the boilerplate terms, Alpha's signal still
has considerable credibility.
70. As noted, supra note 67, if Beta is so efficient that it can profitably undercut even Al
pha's beneficiary terms, exclusion would have occurred with or without the beneficial boilerplate
terms. Therefore, there is no welfare-enhancing effect here in discouraging Beta from trying to
exclude Alpha.
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such beneficial boilerplate terms, if Gamma is imperfectly informed about
Alpha and Beta 's costs and capabilities, Gamma may place a positive prob
ability on the possibility that Alpha and Beta are less efficient or capable
than Gamma is . The odds that Gamma would indeed take its chances and
enter are then greater. Once Gamma is in the market, it becomes harder for
Alpha and Beta to drive G amm a out, as Gamma 's costs of entry will have
already been sunk.
On the other hand, beneficial boilerplate terms could signal to Gamma
that Alpha and Beta are indeed efficient. The signal is credible because Al
pha and Beta are already offering these terms to consumers who read the
boilerplate provisions. If they do so for a relatively long period, it cannot be
the case that they are not efficient enough or not capable of granting such

terms without a loss. 7 1 Gamma then knows that if it enters the market, Alpha
and Beta could offer the attractive terms to all consumers (readers and non

readers alike), thereby making entry less profitable and less likely. Absent
the possibility of beneficial boilerplate terms, such entry deterrence through
signaling becomes much more costly: Alpha and Beta need to offer better
deals to all of their customers.
III. C REATING FALSE APPEARANCES
A. Creating an Illusion of a Fair Contract
As noted in the Introduction, in most legal systems, standard-form con
tracts are subject to judicial review. When courts assess a value-reducing
term in a standard-form contract, they consider the fairness of the contract in
72
Accordingly, a supplier who

its entirety, and not only the particular term.

wishes to minimize the chances that a certain term would be struck down
would try to offset it with beneficial terms, which would help convince the
court that the contract in its entirety is fair.
Such offsetting beneficial terms, however, are costly to the supplier. It
would prefer to "kill two birds with one stone": on the one hand, keep the
oppressive terms intact, and on the other, not have to bear the full cost of the
offsetting beneficial terms. The supplier could achieve this by placing the
beneficial terms in the boilerplate language, so that only those who read and
fully understand them would actually enjoy them. The supplier can influ
ence the number of customers that actually enjoy the beneficial terms by

7 1 . As noted, supra note 67, Alpha and Beta could try to look even more efficient than they
actually are by offering below-cost terms to the readers of the boilerplate provisions. But such a
strategy of incurring Jong-term losses (or sacrificing long-term profits) is often prohibitively costly.
72. See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 260-66 ( 1999) (explaining that unfairness
cannot be detected by analyzing specific terms as seemingly unfair because these terms are usually
concessions granted in exchange for other advantages); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 1 15 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 541 ( 1 967) ("[W]hen the question
is presented as a decision as to the 'unconscionability' of a single contractual provision, the vacu
ousness of the standard is apparent.").
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controlling the complexity of their apprehension and "hiding" them deeper
73
in boilerplate language. This is illustrated by Example 1 1 :

Example

11.

Offsetting Benefits. A dry cleaning

firm sets a term i n its stan

dard-form contract according to which it will not be responsible for
damages above a certain low threshold. Alongside this term is a boilerplate
term providing that a customer interested in purchasing insurance could,
for a fee, be insured for damages above this threshold, provided he fills out
74
a certain form and mails it to the supplier.

When attacked about the value-reducing features of the term exempting
the supplier from liability, the supplier could point out the fact that it is of
fering any customer who is interested full insurance for a relatively low fee.
The supplier could claim that his standard-form contract, viewed in its en
tirety, is fair, and, moreover, efficient, since it induces customers who may
suffer damages above the low threshold to reveal themselves, and provides
lower rates for those customers who do not expect to suffer such damages.
The catch, however, is that this claim assumes complete information on the
part of consumers. In reality, many consumers with potential damages
would not be able to comprehend that the insurance option is worthwhile,
and, moreover, they might not even be aware of the insurance option or of
the exemption from liability, as both are placed in the boilerplate language.
Moreover, the transaction costs a customer has to bear in order to assess the
insurance option, fill out the required form, and mail it to the supplier may
deter her from exercising this option, even if it is a fair one. Accordingly, the
supplier could impose transaction costs and use boilerplate language in or
der to deter most customers from using the insurance option, while still
being able to use this option as an offsetting benefit in court.
Many additional examples exist in which suppliers try to create the ap
pearance of a fair contract while trying to avoid the corresponding costs. A
typical example is that of contracts in which the customer has the option of
canceling his subscription or enrollment within a certain trial period or the
option of returning purchased merchandise. All the supplier needs to do in
order to avoid most of the costs concerning these seemingly fair benefits
granted to customers is to hide them in boilerplate language, make them
difficult for customers to assess or understand, or impose transaction costs
75
upon customers who wish to exercise the option.

73. Transaction costs that would cause all or most customers not to exercise the beneficial
option would be an extreme case of the strategy discussed in the text. Costs that cause only some of
the customers not to exercise the option possibly characterize cases in which the supplier wishes to
price discriminate in favor of customers who exercise the option, see supra Section LB, while still
maintaining the appearance of a fair contract in case value-reducing terms in the contract are at
tacked in court.
74. CA I n9 Dry Cleaning Factories Keshet Ltd. v. Attorney General [1980) IsrSC 34(3)
365. Also see the analogous terms in the standard-form contract of M.P.L., an Israeli firm, which
provides storage services in the custom authority's warehouses (on file with the authors).
7 S. See, e.g., supra note 30 (describing the disconnection policy of the Internet service pro
vider Speakeasy, found in its boilerplate provisions). Similarly, the standard-form contract of Moked
Keshev Lev, an Israeli medical center offering its members urgent medical help services, allocates in
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Finally, suppliers may want to maintain the appearance of a fair contract
not only in the eyes of courts, but also in the eyes of the press, consumer
organizations, or competitors who try to criticize the supplier for value
reducing terms in its standard-form contract. The supplier could then defend
itself from such criticism by pointing out the offsetting beneficial terms, but
still use transaction costs and boilerplate language in order not to bear the
costs of providing the benefits.

B . Hiding Benefits from Third Parties
At times, the supplier wishes to grant certain special benefits to a group
of people who are parties to the supplier's standard contract, but is inter
ested in hiding these benefits from third parties.

Example

12.

Hidden Benefits.

A university has a standard contract with

faculty who are inventors. The contract determines the inventors' rights
and grants them certain special benefits. The terms of the contract, how
ever, are obscure and difficult to understand.

A possible explanation for the obscurity of the contract in Example 1 2 is
that the university does not want faculty members who do not have a chance
of being inventors to observe the extreme benefits granted to the inventors.
Moreover, the obscurity of the contract could help prevent public criticism
of the practice.
IV. A C REDIBLE SIGNAL FOR NOT NEGOTIATING
In many cases a supplier would like to signal to his customers or his
competitors that certain terms in the contract, or at times, the whole con
tract, are not negotiable. We claim that the supplier could impose transaction
costs upon himself, usually with the aid of standard-form contracts, in order
to credibly commit not to negotiate his contracts. Non-negotiability of con
tracts could serve various purposes. We focus here on three purposes that
have received less attention.
A . Signaling Improved Incentives
Non-negotiability of contractual terms could signal that the supplier's
improved incentives, brought about by maintaining these terms in all or
most of the supplier's contracts, remain intact. 76

Example

13.

Warranty.

Joe is a car manufacturer who sells directly to cus

tomers. In his standard sales contracts, there is a two-year warranty. It is

its boilerplate provisions a limited period of time for cancellation of the membership (on file with
the authors). To be sure, at times suppliers may want to make the ability to cancel the contract sali
ent in order to signal their confidence in the quality of their product or service. We are focusing here
on different cases.
76. See Baird, supra note 6, at 2724 ("Unsophisticated consumers are often better off in a
market in which no one can bargain for special terms than in a market where everyone can.").
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important to Joe to signal to his customers that the warranty cannot be
waived.

The reason it is important to Joe to signal to his customers that the war
ranty cannot be waived is that if it could be waived, it would cease to signal
the car's quality. A warranty serves two main goals. First, it provides the
customer with insurance, according to which if the car breaks down, the
supplier would bear the costs of fixing it. But more importantly, a warranty
signals the car's quality, since if the supplier bears the costs of fixing de
fects, he has an incentive to make a better and more reliable car. Many
customers value the quality-signaling virtue of the warranty even more than
77
This is because typically not all of the cus

they value the insurance aspect.

tomer's damages and inconvenience related to a defect would be covered.
Moreover, the customer is interested in a reliable car with no defects for
safety reasons as well, regardless of the insurance aspect.
However, in order for the warranty to credibly signal the car's quality
and reliability, the customer has to know that the warranty applies to all or
most customers. If many customers are expected to waive the warranty, the
supplier's incentives to make a better car would be eroded, and the car's
quality would diminish. Consumers would then insist on paying less for the
car or would prefer a competing car. Indeed, any given customer may try to
waive the warranty in exchange for a refund, in order to obtain a free ride on
the supplier's improved incentives, supposedly achieved via the warranty
granted to all other customers. Many customers would try to do so, however,
78
so that the supplier's improved incentives would no longer exist.
Accordingly, the supplier would be interested in credibly committing not
to negotiate the warranty. One way to do so is to commit contractually not to
negotiate. This would usually not be an effective commitment device, how
ever, because customers would find it hard to monitor the supplier's
relations with all its other customers. An alternative commitment device,
which we are focusing upon here, is to use boilerplate provisions or stan
dard-form contracts to make negotiation over the warranty particularly
difficult and complicated. For example, the boilerplate provisions could
provide that the warranty cannot be waived without prior approval by the
CEO or the board, or without following a cumbersome process.
Alternatively, actual contacts with buyers could be made by the sup
plier's agents, and these agents could have no discretion to negotiate the
contract. Typically, such a supplier will operate with standard-form con
tracts, the terms of which are rigid and not negotiable. Blocking negotiation
by the supplier's agents could be achieved either by an explicit rule forbid
ding negotiation or by filling the boilerplate language with professional or
legal jargon and employing agents that are not capable, or lack sufficient
information or skills, to understand or negotiate the standard terms.

77.

Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 203- 1 6 (2002).

78.

Id. at 2 1 6- 1 7.
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Such mechanisms could serve as a credible commitment on the part of
the supplier not to negotiate. Even if the supplier's agent tries to circumvent
the complicated process and waive a warranty in exchange for a discount,
the customer would hesitate to cooperate out of fear that such negotiated
terms are void due to the circumvention of the required process.
State laws often enable suppliers to submit their standard contracts to a
79
Such submis

certain agency or to the state's attorney general for approval.
sion

of a

supplier's

standard

contracts

enhances

their

rigidity

and

negotiation-proofness. This is because any subsequent change of the con
tract's terms would require resubmission to the state agency for new
approval in order to enjoy the legal defenses inherent in such approval. Also,
a very convincing way for a supplier to signal to consumers that negotiating
the contract is impossible is by making the transaction through the Internet,
0
where, obviously, no live agent conducts any type of negotiation. 8

B . Signaling to Commercial Buyers about Uniformity of Terms
Another case in which a supplier would want to impose upon himself
and his customers costs of negotiating terms is when the supplier wishes to
signal to its customers that prices, or other terms, are uniform for all cus
tomers. The following example illustrates this point:

Example

14.

Nondiscrimination Commitment.

Finn X manufacturers re

frigerators and sells them through various dealers. X is interested in
committing toward the dealers that no dealer is receiving special benefits
compared to other dealers.

The reason it is important for X to commit not to discriminate between
dealers is that if a dealer suspects that X is granting special benefits or dis
counts to another dealer, the first dealer might hesitate to do business with X

or might insist on doing business with x on terms less favorable to X. 81

79. See, e.g., Plain Language Contract Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325G.29-.36 (West 2004
& Supp. 2006). Section 325G.35, entitled "Review by the attorney general" states: "Any seller,
creditor or lessor may submit a consumer contract to the attorney general for review as to whether
the contract complies with the requirements of section 325G.3 I . . . . Any consumer contract certi
fied pursuant to subdivision 1 is deemed to comply with section 325G.3 1 . . . ."
80. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 3, at 468 ("[E]-consumers cannot negotiate be
cause web pages and installation software do not allow for interaction with a live agent.").
8 1 . The supplier may also want to credibly commit to noncommercial consumers that he will
not discriminate among them. End consumers who fear that they could be discriminated against
could feel deceived or believe that the supplier is using them to subsidize other consumers. Novell, a
large seller of infrastructure software and services software, states in its agreement for the sale of
Secure Login that: "NO LICENSOR, DISTRIBUTOR, DEALER, RETAILER, RESELLER,
SALES PERSON, OR EMPLOYEE IS AUTHORIZED TO MODIFY THIS AGREEMENT OR TO
MAKE ANY REPRESENTATION OR PROMISE THAT IS DIFFERENT FROM, OR IN
ADDIDON TO, THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT." Novell, supra note 29. Such a term, cou
pled with the fact that Novell operates with the standard contract from which this term was taken,
helps Novell credibly commit not to negotiate. Other examples consist of firms selling according to
a standard pricelist, which is distributed to all buyers along with a firm statement that prices are
fixed. Negotiating the standard price is difficult, particularly when deals are made via the internet.
Examples include the price list of Easy Garden, a gardening store marketing via the Internet, Easy
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Interestingly, the economics literature finds that even suppliers with market
power or a monopoly position might opportunistically grant benefits to one
commercial buyer at the expense of another buyer competing with the first
buyer, and that such opportunism causes all buyers to pay the supplier lower
82
prices across the board. In order to prevent the price the supplier is able to
charge from decreasing in such a manner, it would be in his interest to make
a commitment not to make concessions to one buyer at the expense of an
other.
One way X can promise not to grant discriminatory benefits is to com
mit contractually not to discriminate. However, such a commitment is
difficult to enforce, and complicated monitoring mechanisms would have to
83
be constructed. Such mechanisms could also be relatively easily circum
vented by X, by offering subtle or disguised benefits. Accordingly, a
possibly more credible way for X to commit not to discriminate is by devel
oping uniform contracts and boilerplate provisions that are difficult for X to
84
negotiate.
•

C . Signaling to Competitors about Uniformity of Terms
Industry mavericks can credibly commit to becoming less eager to cut
prices by making the terms of sale rigid and costly to change. Suppose firm
X, from Example 1 4 above, is an industry maverick. Recall from Section
II.A that an industry maverick would often like to commit to being less ag
gressive in order to induce his rivals to compete less aggressively as well.

Garden, Master Price List (Jan. I, 2005), http://www.easy-garden.com/masterpricelist.htm (listing
prices for gardening supplies and portable poultry shelters), the price list of Entran, a manufacturer
of sensors and electronics, Entran, Accelerometer Price List, http://www.entran.com/pl/plausa.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2005), and the detailed price list of TreePad, TreePad Price List,
http://www.treepad.com/pricelist/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2005) (listing prices for its personal infor
mation manager program and Word Processor) .
82. See David Gilo, Retail Competition Percolating Through to Suppliers and the Use of
Vertical Integration, Tying, and Vertical Restraints To Stop It, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 23, 25-75 (2003);
Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
EcoN. ACTIVITY: MICROECON., 1 990, at 205; R. Preston McAfee & Marius Schwartz, Opportunism
in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity, 84 AM. EcoN.
R EV. 210 ( 1 994); Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts, 23
RAND J. EcoN. 299, 305 ( 1 992).
83. Indeed, the statutory ban on secondary-line price discrimination, included in Section I (a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 1 5 U.S.C. § 1 3(a) (2000), forbids a supplier from discriminating be
tween competing dealers. This prohibition, however, is difficult to enforce, and infringements are
difficult to observe or verify in court. A related practice is that of "most favored-consumer clauses,"
clauses according to which a supplier promises all buyers that if one receives a discount, all of the
others will receive the same discount. Such clauses too are difficult and costly to implement, and, at
times, could draw unwanted antitrust attention. See Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with
Horizontal Consequences: Competitive Effects of "Most-Favored-Customer" Clauses, 64 ANTI
TRUST L.J. 5 17 ( 1 996); Thomas E. Cooper, Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion, 1 7
RAND J. EcoN. 377 ( 1 986); Gilo, supra note 82, at 67-69.
84. Indeed, McAfee and Schwartz claim that franchisors use uniform and rigid contracts
with franchisees in order to better commit to not negotiate them. However, they discuss uniformity
alone, rather than mechanisms that raise the costs of negotiation. McAfee & Schwartz, supra note
82, at 2 1 3.
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Finn X could often make more from price cutting (and therefore be
more aggressive) if its price cuts could be kept secret (for example, by rene
gotiating the terms of the contract only with a small group of large and
discrete dealers), since then its rivals would react more slowly, if at all, and
X's short-term gain from price cutting would be greater. Of course, X could
cut prices (or offer an analogous benefit to buyers) by changing the terms of
its standard-form contract across the board. Such a price cut, however,
would be easier for X's rivals to detect quickly, and, accordingly, they would
respond quickly, by price cutting themselves. Therefore, operating with rigid
standard-form contracts and raising the transaction costs of negotiating the
contract with buyers can serve as a credible commitment by X not to cut
5
prices, since it makes the price cut more transparent to X's rivals . 8 This
could facilitate tacit collusion in X's industry if X is an industry maverick.
V. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF HIDING
B ENEFITS IN THE B OILERPLATE

Identifying the various uses of boilerplate language and artificial trans
action costs imposed on buyers raises the question of whether these uses are
desirable from a social point of view. If the answer is negative, a second
question arises: should the law intervene, and if so, by what means? The
analysis in Parts I-IV reveals that there are two specific practices that may
raise legal concerns that have been ignored by the current literature and by
courts. The first is the practice of artificially complicating the transaction in
ways that benefit suppliers at the expense of buyers, and the second is the
practice of hiding benefits in the boilerplate. In what follows, we shall focus
on the policy implications of the latter.
Throughout Parts I-III above, we have shown that hiding benefits in the
boilerplate could benefit suppliers at the expense of some or all buyers in
various ways. First, as shown in Section LB , hidden benefits could be used
to price discriminate between readers of the boilerplate and nonreaders.
Second, as shown in Sections Il.C and 11.D, beneficial boilerplate terms
could be used by suppliers to harm competition. Finally, as shown in Sec
tion III.A, suppliers could hide benefits in the boilerplate in order to create
the illusion of a fair contract. Let us separately explore the policy implica
tions of each of these three uses of beneficial boilerplate terms. Such an
analysis will help us advise courts as to how they could cope with cases of
beneficial boilerplate terms that raise policy concerns.

85. With regard to most-favored-consumer clauses, discussed supra note 83, the literature
has indeed implied that they could facilitate tacit collusion. See Baker, supra note 83, at 5 19-20;
Cooper, supra note 83. As noted, however, such clauses are difficult to implement and could draw
i;ntitrust scrutiny, while plain rigidity and difficulty of negotiation could more easily and credibly be
implemented and does not currently draw antitrust attention. Therefore, the supplier may prefer
using transaction costs and rigidity.
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A . Price Discrimination

The practice of price discrimination through boilerplate provisions could
raise objections from two different perspectives. The first is the social-policy
perspective; the second is the perspective of the relationship between the
supplier and the consumer who was adversely affected by the discrimina
tion. We shall discuss these two perspectives separately.
Social Welfare Perspective. If the supplier were able to charge each con
sumer exactly what the consumer was willing to pay ("perfect price
discrimination") such pricing would be socially efficient and superior to
uniform pricing since all consumers who value the product more than the
86
marginal costs of supplying it would receive the product. The kind of dis
crimination achieved by hiding benefits in boilerplate provisions, however,
is an imperfect kind. The supplier is unaware of each and every consumer's
willingness to pay. The only thing he is assumed to realize here is that con
sumers who are ready to incur the transaction costs of reading,
understanding, and remembering benefits hidden in boilerplate provisions
("readers") are, on average, willing to pay less (or unwilling to receive less
value) than nonreaders.
Accordingly, for example, if the uniform price the supplier would set ab
sent discrimination is $90, by hiding benefits in boilerplate provisions, he is
induced to set a posted price larger than $90 (say, $ 1 00) to nonreaders and
to offer readers a price lower than $90 (say, $80). He can do so by offering
readers a special discount of $20 off the posted price of $ 100. It may be,
however, that some readers would have purchased the product even for the
uniform price of $90, while some nonreaders, who would have purchased
the product for $90, end up not purchasing the product for the posted price
of $ 100.
This imperfection of discrimination via boilerplate provisions poten
tially causes two kinds of welfare losses. The first stems from nonreaders
who would have purchased the product for $90, but would not purchase it
for $ 1 00. Their valuation for the product (of between $90 and $ 100) is
above the marginal costs of producing it (which are clearly below the uni
form price of $90), but discrimination via boilerplate provisions causes them
not to purchase the product. The larger the number of such consumers (non
readers whose valuation of the product is between $90 and $ 100), the
greater the deadweight loss caused by discrimination via boilerplate provi
sions.
The second welfare loss stems from the transaction costs imposed by the
boilerplate provisions and born by readers who would have purchased the
product even for the uniform price of $90, but are induced to read the boi
lerplate provisions in order to receive the special discount. The fact that they
earn the discount of $20 is a mere transfer from the supplier to them, while
the transaction costs expended on reading, understanding, and remembering
the boilerplate provisions are a deadweight loss. This loss could have been
86.

See TiROLE, supra note 40, at 1 36.
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avoided absent discrimination via the discount hidden in the boilerplate lan
guage. The larger the number of such consumers (readers who value the
product more than $90), the larger the welfare loss. A related welfare loss
involves accidental readers-those who read the boilerplate provisions but
ultimately decide not to purchase despite the discount. Such "accidents"
may occur since consumers cannot grasp the full extent of the benefit hid
den in boilerplate provisions until they actually bear most of the transaction
costs involved. The harder it is for a consumer to predict the extent of the
benefit from just skimming the boilerplate provisions, the larger the prob
ability of such an accident (and the larger the related welfare loss). All
transaction costs' related losses are of course larger the more costly it is for
a consumer to read, understand, and remember the benefit embedded in boi
lerplate provisions.
These welfare losses should be compared to the welfare gain from hid
ing the discount in the boilerplate provisions. This gain is attributable to
readers who would not have purchased the product for the uniform price of
$90 and are induced to purchase it for $80 on account of the discount. The
more readers who value the product between $80 and $90, the larger this
welfare gain. From this welfare gain one has to subtract, however, the trans
action costs such readers need to bear in order to utilize the discount.
Admittedly, in a given case, it would be difficult for a court to assess and
compare the welfare losses and gains. In order to do so, it would be helpful
to assess whether the number of units the supplier sells expanded following
the practice of hiding benefits in boilerplate provisions. If the number of
units expanded, it would make a case in favor of nonintervention. On the
other hand, if the number of units diminished following the practice, there is
a strong case in favor of banning it. Such evidence implies that the practice
caused more nonreaders to stop purchasing than it caused readers to start
purchasing. On top of these considerations, one should take account of the
loss involved in the transaction costs of reading the boilerplate provisions.
But an ex post examination of whether the supplier supplies more or fewer
units following the practice of discriminating via beneficial boilerplate
terms is extremely difficult. This is because there are several other factors,
unrelated to the practice, which could affect the number of units he supplies,
including shifts in demand, cost, brand loyalty, and the intensity of competi
tion.
The distributive effects of discrimination via boilerplate provisions
could also be of interest. Obviously, discrimination transfers value from
nonreaders to readers and suppliers. The distributive concerns therefore
hinge on the identity of readers versus the identity of nonreaders. In many
cases, readers are the less fortunate consumers-those with lower means,
unsteady jobs, and more time on their hands. In such cases, egalitarian con
cerns work in favor of permitting discrimination via boilerplate provisions.
In other cases, readers could consist predominantly of repeat purchasers or
sophisticated customers. Here it is less obvious whether it would be advis-
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able for such customers to be enriched at the expense of nonreaders, who
87
are one-time or less sophisticated customers.
What are the welfare effects of the "drawing mode" of price discrimina
tion via boilerplate provisions? Recall that with this type of price
discrimination, the supplier "draws" the benefits in favor of some consum
ers, particularly those who are on the verge of not purchasing the product.
This type of discrimination arguably causes even fewer welfare losses than
the previous type, since the supplier "cherry picks" consumers with low
willingness to pay according to their behavior. Many nonreaders who would
not have purchased the product would be induced to purchase it in the draw
ing mode. Furthermore, transaction costs incurred in reading the boilerplate
provisions are expected to be smaller, as the supplier assists some consum
ers by making the benefits hidden in the boilerplate provisions salient.
Accordingly, there is an even stronger case for nonintervention in the draw
ing mode of price discrimination than there is in the nondrawing mode
discussed above.
The above welfare analysis implies that it would be extremely difficult
to identify cases in which discrimination via boilerplate language is welfare
reducing. Accordingly, we believe that intervention should particularly
hinge not merely on the discriminatory nature of beneficial boilerplate terms
but rather on their other two uses: harming competition and creating the
appearance of a fair contract. Still, total welfare effects notwithstanding, one
should consider how and when current doctrines concerning the supplier
consumer relationship could be applied to discrimination via boilerplate.
Supplier-Consumer Perspective. One possible claim a nonreader could
invoke against the supplier is that the supplier failed to disclose to him that
other consumers got a better deal than the one he got. In particular, the non
reader could claim that this undisclosed fact is a material part of the bargain,
and since the supplier failed to disclose it, the consumer is entitled to re
scind the contract or even sue for damages or enforce the beneficial terms in
his favor. More specifically, such a consumer would attempt to argue that
the supplier should have revealed to him that there were benefits hidden in
boilerplate provisions.
There are numerous consumer protection statutes that impose duties of
disclosure. However, most of these statutes oblige suppliers to disclose ex
clusionary clauses, limitations on explicit or implicit warranties, and many
other terms that could constitute "a (bad) surprise" to a consumer who does
88
not, or cannot, read boilerplate provisions carefully enough. Such statutes

87.
It could be asked how discrimination via boilerplate language compares with other forms
of imperfect price discrimination (that is. discrimination based on other proxies for a person's will
ingness to pay, such as age, occupation, and so forth). One notable point in this respect is that since
discrimination via boilerplate language does not directly hinge on a consumer's characteristics, and
since in this type of discrimination most consumers who are discriminated against are actually un
aware of it, this form of discrimination arguably causes less consumer frustration than other types.
88.
For Instance, the Truth in Lending Act is aimed at increasing disclosure of credit costs to
borrowers. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 60 1 -07(c) (2000). Similarly, the Equal Credit Op
portunity Act mandates that an applicant for credit is entitled to disclosures explaining the reasons
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are not relevant to our case, since we are dealing here with "good" sur
prises-and not "bad" surprises-the consumer was unaware of.
Other statutes, prevailing in several states, impose a duty on suppliers to
89
draft consumers' contracts in plain language. Such statutes could be of
relevance to us, as long as the transaction costs consumers need to incur in
order to reveal the benefits in boilerplate provisions stem from difficulties in
understanding the wording of the contract. The plain-language statutes are
not relevant, however, to cases where the difficulties lie in the length of the
boilerplate language, the short time the consumer can dedicate to reading
and understanding it, or her efforts in remembering to take the necessary
steps in order to receive the benefits after entering into the contract.
The common law also imposes upon a supplier a duty of disclosure in
appropriate cases. In certain special cases, the consumer may have reason
able expectations-stemming from his special relationship with the supplier
or from a promise or representation made by the supplier-that he would
90
disclose any material fact of the bargain to the consumer. A special rela
tionship could also be deduced from the ongoing or long-term relationship
between the supplier and the consumer, which gives rise to a duty of disclo
91
sure. In such special cases, regardless of the welfare analysis we conducted
above, there could be grounds under contract law for the consumer to re
92
scind the contract due to nondisclosure of the hidden benefits, and even, in

why credit has been denied or revoked. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 69 1 (a)-(f)
(2000). The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act requires preparation and distribution of booklets
that explain the nature and costs of real estate settlements. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act,
1 2 U.S.C. §§ 2601-07 (2000) . Finally, the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act requires, among
other things, a statement of record describing those with interests in the land, all conditions and
plans with respect to the land, and the types of sales and transactions contemplated. Interstate Land
Sales Full Disclosure Act, 1 5 U.S.C. §§ 1 70 1 -20 (2000).
89. See, e.g., Plain Language Contract Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325G.29-.36 (West 2004
& Supp. 2006). Several other states have adopted similar laws. See, e.g., Consumer Contract Aware
ness Act of 1 990, CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1 799.200--.206 (West 1998); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42- 1 5 1 to
42-158 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. ti. 6 §§ 273 1 -36 ( 1 999); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 487-1 to -4 ( 1 995);
Plain Language in Contracts Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30- 14- 1 1 0 1 to - 1 1 04, - 1 1 1 1 to - 1 1 1 3
(2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56: 1 2 - 1 to -86 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); N.Y. GEN. 0BLIG. LAW § 5702 (McKinney 200 1 ); 69 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1 20 1 - 1 2 (West 2004); w. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46A-6- 109 (LexisNexis 1999).
90. See generally United States ex rel. Bussen Quarries, Inc. v. Thomas, 938 F.2d 83 1 , 834
(8th Cir. 1991 ); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First Nat'! Bank of Little Rock, Ark.,
774 F.2d 909, 9 1 3 (8th Cir. 1 985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 6 1 ( 1 98 1 ); RE
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 55 1 ( 1 977); JoHN D. CALAMARI & JoSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 9.20, at 337 (4th ed. 1 998); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 4. 1 5.
9 1 . See generally Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OsGOODE
HALL L.J. 5, 20--22 ( 1 984) (describing consumers' transactions as a long-term bureaucratic contrac
tual relationship).
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 303(b); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§§ 8 cmt. e, 28 ( 1 937); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, §§ 4. 1 1 , 4. 1 5 (discussing the effects of nondis
closure and the remedies for misrepresentation).
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appropriate cases, to sue for damages or enforcement of the beneficial terms
93
on his behalf.
B . Using Beneficial Boilerplate Terms to Hann Competition
As demonstrated in Section 11.C, when suppliers place beneficial terms
in boilerplate language, tacit or explicit collusion could be more sustainable
than when such a practice is banned. Note that when the practice is banned,
if collusion breaks down, nonreaders and readers of the boilerplate provi
sions

alike enjoy competitive terms.

This

means

that the collusion

facilitating characteristic of creating beneficial boilerplate terms is unambi
guously harmful. Recall also that, in Example 10, even if only supplier
Alpha has beneficial boilerplate provisions while Beta is the industry maver
ick, such a practice could facilitate collusion and therefore be harmful. Even
if Alpha is the industry maverick, the practice would facilitate collusion
94
when it raises Alpha's collusive profits due to its discriminatory attributes.
Similar are the anticompetitive harms from beneficial boilerplate provi
sions that encourage anticompetitive accommodation by rivals or deter
entry, as discussed in Section 11.D, above. The fear of anticompetitive ac
commodation and entry deterrence takes place in cases similar to those
referred to above in the discussion of collusion: industries with only a few
substantial players. In such industries, tacit collusion is likely and imperfect
competition is abundant; failed attempts by suppliers to exclude their rivals,
as well as entry of new firms, are welcome, as they could dissipate supra
competitive pricing.
Accordingly, while the mere discriminatory characteristics of beneficial
boilerplate terms do not justify intervention (subject to cases involving spe
95
cial relationships between the supplier and the customer), when beneficial
boilerplate terms are adopted by suppliers in an oligopolistic setting, the
case for legal intervention is strengthened due to the potential anticompeti
tive effects. Naturally, the most appropriate legal tools to deal with such
effects are the antitrust laws.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits restraints of trade, re
quires an agreement between at least two entities for it to be violated. In

93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 55 1 (''The party in the wrong is liable for the
loss caused to the injured party by its reliance on the misrepresentation, promise, or undertaking in
question .. . . ."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 4. 1 5 .
When the beneficial boilerplate term involves warranties, a suit b y a nonreader may b e brought
also for breach of an implied warranty. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § § 1 04, 108, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2304(e), 2308 (2000) (stating that the supplier cannot disclaim implied warranties, and if the
supplier designates a written warranty as "full;' it must meet stated requirements, including an un
dertaking to provide a remedy without charge by repair, replacement, or refund); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 2, at § 4.29; see also Mo. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW § 2-3 1 6. l (LexisNexis 2002); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-3 1 6A (LexisNexis 1 998) (prohibiting disclaimers of implied warranties).
94. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing how beneficial boilerplate terms
could raise the collusive profits of the supplier adopting them, thereby deterring him from deviating
from collusion).
95.

See supra

notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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contrast, hiding benefits in boilerplate language seems to be a strictly unilat
eral action. A rather bold and convention-breaking approach could be to
draw an analogy between hiding benefits in boilerplate language and exclu
sive-distribution agreements. In an exclusive-distribution agreement, a
supplier commits toward buyer A that he will not sell to buyer B . Such
agreements could violate section 1 of the Sherman Act where their potential
96
harm to competition outweighs their benefits to consumers. An analogous
agreement is one where the supplier makes a commitment to buyer A that
97
buyer A will receive benefits that buyer B will not receive. Creating benefi
cial boilerplate provisions, available only to those who read, understand, and
remember them resembles the latter kind of agreement: by imposing pro
hibitive transaction costs on one group of consumers (those who do not read
boilerplate language), the supplier makes a commitment to another group of
consumers (those who do read boilerplate language) that only they will re
ceive the benefits. From a public policy point of view, there should be no
difference between the way antitrust law deals with this practice and the
way it deals with two-sided vertical agreements that achieve similar out
comes.
One possible way to tackle the above-mentioned doctrinal problem re
garding Sherman Act section 1 's agreement requirement is to use section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, empowering the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") to intervene in cases of "unfair methods of competi
98
tion . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Hiding benefits in
boilerplate language in a way that facilitates collusion, encourages anticom
petitive accommodation, or deters entry, could be regarded both as an
99
"unfair method of competition" and as an "unfair or deceptive practice."
96.
1957).

See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 4 1 8 (D.C. Cir.

97. Such an agreement is the flip side of a "most-favored-consumer" agreement, according
to which the supplier commits to buyer A that if buyer B receives a benefit, buyer A will receive the
same benefit. Such agreements have been claimed to be subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act.
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 83.
98.

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l ) (2000).

99. The FTC, however, did not succeed in using section 5 to ban "most-favored-consumer"
clauses or uniform-delivered pricing. In £./. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FfC, 729 F.2d 1 30, 1 30
(2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit reversed the FTC's decision that various facilitating practices,
including uniform-delivered pricing, most-favored-customer contracts, and advance notice of price
increases, violated section 5 of the FTC Act. The court based its conclusion, in part, on the fact that
there was no evidence of the absence of an independent legitimate business reason for the defen
dant's conduct. Id. at 140. See generally Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An
Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices after Ethyl Corp., 1 983 Wis. L. REV. 887, 890 (outlining
the economic and legal attributes of facilitating practices and explaining the circumstances in which
they could facilitate price and output coordination).
Furthermore, the FTC has attempted to attack price signaling as an illegal facilitating practice
under section 5 of the FTC Act. In three complaints (all of which were eventually settled), the FTC
alleged that certain "invitations-to-collude" constituted unfair methods of competition. In each of
those cases, the defendants had solicited their rivals to engage in a price-fixing conspiracy by signal
ing their intentions to price at a particular level. See YKK (U.S.A.) Inc., [ 1 993-1 997 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 23,355 (Fed. Trade Comm'n July I , 1993) (consent order) (deal
ing with a supplier's request that his competitor stop offering free equipment to customers); AE
Clevite, Inc., [1993-1997 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 23,354 (Fed. Trade Comm'n
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has interpreted section 5 broadly, holding that:
"[T]he Commission has broad powers to declare trade practices unfair. This
broad power . . . is particularly well established with regard to trade prac

tices which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts

even though such practices may not actually violate these laws." 100 Accord

ingly, section 5 of the FTC Act, as interpreted by the courts, is well suited to

cover cases in which public policy warrants intervention, while Sherman Act
section 1 , if strictly interpreted, falls short of applying to the case due to its
strict requirement for a two-sided agreement.

An alternative approach would be to allow nonreaders of boilerplate

language to attack the supplier under the statutes or common law regarding
the supplier's disclosure requirements. Recall that we concluded in Section

V.A.2 above, that such an approach would usually be unwarranted if the

plaintiff's sole claim was that he was the victim of price discrimination. In

cases in which the practice facilitates cartels, raises prices, or deters entry,
however, intervention through disclosure rules becomes warranted. In par

ticular, the claim would be that beneficial boilerplate terms harm nonreaders

not only by discriminating against them, but by facilitating noncompetition

over the terms they receive. Absent the practice, collusion would have been

more likely to break down, failed attempts to exclude rival suppliers and

new entry would have driven prices down, and nonreaders and readers of
boilerplate language alike would then have enjoyed competitive terms.

Another doctrine based on contract law that could be used to fight bene

ficial boilerplate provisions that harm competition is the ability to declare
contracts with nonreaders unenforceable for public policy considerations, as
is done with some other types of anticompetitive agreements.

wi

Hiding benefits in boilerplate language in a way that harms competition

could also be attacked, in our opinion, as illegal price discrimination under
the Robinson-Patman Act or similar state laws prohibiting price discrimina

tion that may harm competition. Recall that discrimination between readers
and nonreaders of boilerplate terms is the driving force behind the anticom

petitive effects. The Robinson-Patman Act provides, in relevant part, that

"[i]t shall be unlawful . . . to discriminate in price . . . where the effect of
02
Indeed, a

such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition." 1

June 8, 1993) (consent order) (dealing with a supplier's statement to his competitor that the com
petitor's low prices were "ruining the marketplace"); Quality Trailer Prods. Corp., [1987-1993
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'j[ 23,246 (Nov. 5, 1 992) (consent order) (same).
1 00.

FfC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 3 1 6, 320-21 ( 1966).

1 0 1 . See RESTATEMENT (SECON<>) O F CONTRACTS § 1 88 ( 1 98 1 ) ("A promise to refrain from
competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship
is unreasonably in restraint of trade . . . ."). See generally GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, 15 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 80.6, at 63-65 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003).
1 02.
1 5 U.S.C. § 1 3 (a) ( 1 994). Section 5 (a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(l ) (2000) , has been construed as containing an overlapping prohibition of discrimination.
See FfC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 ( 1 953); Standard Oil Co. v. FfC,
340 U.S. 23 1 , 239-42 ( 195 1 ). State statutes banning price discrimination or unfair competition
could also be invoked. See, e.g. , Cow. REV. STAT. § 6-2- 102 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-1 lOb
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supplier hiding benefits in boilerplate language charges different prices (or
104
offers different qualities) w3 to readers and nonreaders.
The supplier could claim, in its defense, that beneficial boilerplate pro
visions do not constitute price discrimination because all consumers have
the opportunity to enjoy them. Although it could be claimed that nonreaders
could have also enjoyed the benefits if they only took the time and effort to
read, understand, and remember the boilerplate provisions, in reality they
find the transaction costs of doing so prohibitively costly. Their situation
bears some resemblance to commercial buyers who are too small for a sup
plier's quantity discounts to be functionally available to them. Such
commercial buyers have been held by the Supreme Court to be victims of
105
illegal price discrimination inherent in the quantity discounts. This is not
withstanding the fact that these buyers could have been eligible for the
quantity discount had they borne certain costs, such as the costs of expand
ing, buying quantities they did not need, or buying cooperatively.
Finally, when it is a dominant firm that hides benefits in its boilerplate
language and this tends to deter the entry of new firms, as illustrated in Sec
tion 11.D.2, this dominant firm could be accused of illegal monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. This section can encompass unilateral
106
actions by a dominant firm that help enshrine its dominance. Since this
IO?
section also applies to unilateral actions, the above-mentioned doctrinal

(2005) (for unfair competition); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-45 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 1 3-5-3
(2005) (for price discrimination).
1 03. To the best of our knowledge, however, the Robinson-Patman Act's ban of price dis
crimination has not been applied to quality discrimination. Since quality and price are equivalent
discriminatory tools in various contexts, such an application, in the types of cases discussed in the
text, would be warranted.
1 04. The Robinson-Patman Act deals with several kinds of injury: injury to competition be
tween suppliers ("primary line cases"), injury to the supplier's commercial buyers who suffered a
competitive disadvantage due to the supplier's discrimination in favor of another commercial buyer
("secondary line cases"), and injury to the buyers' buyers from such discrimination ("tertiary line
cases"). See FREDERICK M. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT
1 4 1 , 1 72-73 (S. Chesterfield Oppenheim ed., 1 962). The kind of injury discussed here is that of
primary line cases, since the harm to competition is between the supplier practicing discrimination
via the boilerplate provisions and his rivals . Presumably, secondary line and tertiary line cases are
less relevant in the current context, since commercial buyers are usually induced to read benefits
placed in the supplier's boilerplate language.
105. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 42 ( 1 948); Edlin, supra note 26, at 559 n. 102
(making a similar claim in favor of banning price matching as i llegal price discrimination). Al
though cases such as Monon Salt deal with discrimination against commercial buyers ("secondary
line cases"), they are applicable here too, since they discuss the fundamental question of whether
price discrimination has occurred. This question is equally relevant to primary line cases, such as the
case before us.
1 06. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 45 1 , 481 ( 1 992);
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 1 72, 1 74 ( 1 965); United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 3 5 1 U.S. 377, 391-92 ( 1 956); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grum
man Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1 1 47, 1 1 8 1-82 ( 1 st Cir. 1 994); United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2000) .
1 07.

The Supreme Court has held:
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hurdle regarding the agreement requirement of Sherman Act section 1 does
not exist.
Naturally, intervention becomes more and more warranted the more
concentrated is the industry (that is, the fewer significant players there are in
the relevant market), the more significant are the suppliers who adopted the
beneficial boilerplate terms, and the more abundant is the practice among
suppliers. If the court finds that the relevant market is open to the entry of
new significant firms or the expansion of currently insignificant firms, and
that such entry or expansion is likely in the near future (even after taking
account of the possible entry-deterring effect of beneficial boilerplate
terms), then intervention becomes less warranted.
To be sure, we are not advocating here a per se prohibition of beneficial
boilerplate terms adopted by oligopolistic suppliers. Suppliers should be
allowed to claim, in a particular case, that the practice involves welfare
enhancing attributes that outweigh the potential anticompetitive harm. The
court would then face the nontrivial task of balancing the probable anticom
petitive threat and the welfare-enhancing benefits.

Such balancing is

extremely familiar to courts in antitrust cases involving conduct that is not
108
illegal per se but still raises considerable anticompetitive concems.
C. Creating an Illusion of a Fair Contract
Section V.A, above, showed that the discriminatory attributes of benefi
cial boilerplate terms, in and of themselves, do not warrant intervention, and
Section V.B showed how beneficial boilerplate terms adopted by oligopolis
tic suppliers could warrant intervention on account of their potential
anticompetitive effects. At times, however, beneficial boilerplate terms raise
policy concerns even absent an oligopolistic setting, when they are used by
the supplier to create a false appearance of a fair contract by introducing
beneficial terms that are not enjoyed by most consumers. Courts that review
standard-form contracts should be aware of this. Therefore, when courts
consider a standard-form contract, they should look not only at the appear
ance of the contract and at its theoretical potential to be fair, but rather at its

The Sherman Act contains a "basic distinction between concerted and independent action."
The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful only when it threatens
actual monopolization . . . .
Section 1 of the Shennan Act, in contrast, reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effected by
a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" between separate entities. It does not reach con
duct that is "wholly unilateral."
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 ( 1 984) (citations omitted)
(second omission in original); see also Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761
( 1984).

108. On top of such a balancing test based on a total welfare perspective, courts would occa
sionally need to address contractual doctrines concerning a special relationship between the supplier
and a particular buyer. See supra notes 90--92 and accompanying text.
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fairness in fact, given the transaction costs imposed on consumers who may
want to enjoy its beneficial terms. 109
For example, if while litigating a standard-form contract, the supplier
tries to emphasize a term that gives consumers a way out of the transaction,
the court should consider whether most consumers are really aware of that
term and are capable of using it easily enough. The existence of the term in
and of itself should not be a reason to conclude that the contract is fair as
long as the court is not convinced that most consumers can really use it to
their benefit.
In the context of Example 1 1 , a court should consider whether the dry
cleaning firm took the necessary steps to make the advantages and disadvan
tages of insuring clothes against loss or damage clear to all consumers. It
should also consider whether insurance was made easily available to those
who were willing to pay for it. It is quite possible, though, that given the
small scale of the transaction, most consumers would find the transaction
costs involved prohibitively high, even if the cleaning firm took all neces
sary steps to lower these costs. If this were the case, the reviewing court
could assume that insurance was not a feasible option and consider the con
tract's fairness under that assumption.
CONCLUSION

Unlike previous literature, this Article did not focus on the asymmetric
information between the supplier and consumers created by boilerplate lan
guage that includes harsh terms. We focused on other benefits the supplier
can derive from the transaction costs that boilerplate language and standard
form contracts create, most of which have been ignored by courts and legal
writers. The main goal of this Article was to identify these hidden roles of
boilerplate language and the artificial imposition of transaction costs and to
focus attention on them.
As the Article has demonstrated, transaction costs generated through
boilerplate language or in other artificial means could have different impacts
on different types of consumers, enabling, inter alia, the screening out of
unwanted consumers, price discrimination, cartel stabilization, and the
studying of consumer preferences. On other occasions, the transaction costs
are imposed in order to hide benefits granted to certain consumers. On yet
other occasions the transaction costs are self-imposed by the supplier in or
der to signal to buyers or competitors that negotiation of the contract would
be very costly.
There are also cases in which boilerplate language and the artificial im
position of transaction costs do create asymmetry of information between
the supplier and its consumers, as in the classic discussions of boilerplate
language, but the asymmetry is used as a cartel-facilitating tool, an anticom
petitive signaling device, or a tool for creating the appearance of a fair
contract, rather than to merely extract surplus from uninformed consumers.
1 09.

See supra note 72.
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Some of the uses of boilerplate language and transaction costs that we
identify are desirable (such as signaling not to negotiate a warranty) and
some are not (such as facilitating ethnic discrimination, artificially compli

cating the contract in order to harm competition, and creating a false
appearance of a fair contract). Most of the uses, however, are in between

these two polarities, and their desirability depends on the particular circum

stances of the case (such as some cases of screening out small buyers, some

cases of price discrimination, and some cases of collecting information
about consumer preferences).

We identified two practices that especially raise policy concerns. The

first is the practice of artificially complicating the transaction, and the sec
ond is the practice of hiding benefits in the boilerplate. These concerns are
new to the legal scholarship and case law and should be addressed by courts

in appropriate cases. Part V of the Article approached the question of
whether and when the use of beneficial boilerplate terms is desirable from a

social perspective, and if not, we ask how the law should discourage them.

W hen beneficial boilerplate terms are adopted in oligopolistic markets, legal
intervention could be required in order to cope with the anticompetitive ef

fects of such a practice in such a setting, subject to a balancing examination
between the degree of potential harm to competition and possible welfare

enhancing benefits of the practice in a particular case. We show how current
antitrust and contract law doctrines could be applied in order to cope with

these policy concerns. Regardless of the structure of the market, courts

should also intervene when there is a special relationship between the sup

plier and the harined customer raising a valid claim under contract law.

Also, when a supplier tries to create the illusion of a fair contract by using a
beneficial boilerplate term that is not really enjoyed by most consumers,

courts should acknowledge the inaccessibility of the hidden benefit rather
than judging the contract as if all consumers could enjoy the benefits.

It is hard to verify whether suppliers are really trying to achieve most or

all of the different goals discussed in this Article. It is also hard to know
whether suppliers are even aware of the different uses of boilerplate lan

guage and of artificial transaction costs imposed upon consumers. But even
if suppliers are completely ignorant of these goals and uses, it is still impor

tant to be aware of the consequences, even if unintended, of using

boilerplate language. The aim of this Article was to illuminate these conse
quences.
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